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IDENTIFYING ROLES AND SETTING PRIORITY FOR CANADA WITHIN THE EMERGING ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL ORDER:

A "Bottom-up" Approch to Policy Design and Evaluation

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Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security
Consortium canadien sur la sécurité en Asie-Pacifique

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Through the preparation of this paper, Brian J. Bow was a Research Associate at the Centre for International and Security Studies at York University. He received his M.A. (Political Science) from York University in 1996, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. (Government) at Cornell University.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This paper was originally prepared during the Spring of 1997. Though it does not review some relevant recent developments (e.g., 1997 National Forum on Canada's International Relations), the analysis and recommendations presented here involve a variety of issues which are of enduring importance for Canada's Asia Pacific relations, and for the Canadian foreign policy-making process more generally.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABAC	APEC Business Advisory Council
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
APECRIN	APEC Research Information Network
APFC	Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CANCAPS	Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMC/CSCAP	Canadian Member Committee of CSCAP
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CYAP	Canada's Year of Asia Pacific
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
SME	small or medium-sized enterprise

INTRODUCTION

In keeping with its long-standing commitment to cooperative multilateralism in support of international peace and prosperity, Canada has played a meaningful role over the last twenty years in the search for a stable and rewarding institutional architecture in the Asia Pacific region. It is not clear, however, that Canada's participation in the institutional fora and practices that make up this evolving regional architecture has been informed by a clear sense of long-term purposes and priorities.

This is reflected in, and most likely has much to do with, the way in which policy research on Canada's Asia Pacific relations is often conducted and presented. A typical twenty-page article or report is likely to feature a ten-page review of recent trends in Eastern Asian politics, a nine-page inventory of policy proposals and controversies, and a one-page epilogue on multilateral initiatives that Canada ought to support. By merely wedging Canada into an otherwise generic analysis, studies of this sort—no matter how penetrating their theoretical or practical insights—remain "dislocated" from both the Canadian public and the government foreign policy-making establishment. First, in failing to relate regional issues and policy options to the larger context of Canada's global commitments and national capabilities, these studies present themselves as merely hypothetical (that is, "academic" in the worst sense of the word). Second, in failing to relate policy options to the evolving aspirations and concerns of Canadians—effectively taking Canada's international aims as pre-given—they reinforce the perception that foreign policy follows an objectively-measurable "national interest," which is mysteriously divined by experts and separate from the everyday experiences of Canadians.

Rather than beginning with free-floating problems and solutions and then attaching Canada to some of them, it seems sensible to begin with some idea of Canada's purposes and priorities in the region, put these in context with respect to the country's international commitments and capabilities, and then identify specific policy initiatives through which these goals and values might be realized. This principle should apply not only to the design of policy-oriented research programs, but also to the design and implementation of policy itself. Indeed, government policy statements and actions bearing on the evolving Asia Pacific regional order often appear to have more to do with servicing particular groups of supporters at home or passively following the flow of regional relations than they do with any kind of well-anchored sense of who Canada is supposed to be and what it is supposed to do within the regional context. Clearly, there is a need for the development (and publicization) of a comprehensive strategy for regional engagement, to guide policy decisions and locate Canadian involvement in the region within the broader context

of our international agenda. But such a strategy cannot simply be cobbled together from existing policy studies. In order to achieve sustained support and effectiveness, it should draw on the skills and experiences of the widest possible cross-section of Canadian society, and self-consciously reflect the collective purposes and ideals of Canadians. A Canadian strategy for regional engagement should therefore grow out of the realization of a strategy for domestic engagement, designed to cultivate public awareness of and interest in Canada's Asia Pacific relations, bring various sectors of Canadian society together with government in a climate of informed dialogue and constructive debate, and integrate these public inputs into coherent guidelines for regional policy.

This does not mean that government should be merely a passive mechanism through which raw societal inputs are converted into international action. Nor should policy research, whether by government agencies or by academic experts, be confined to working out the technical details of international strategies selected in the wider public sphere. A "bottom-up" approach to foreign policy-making must still leave room for the government of the day to follow its vision of Canada's international future, and to exercise initiative and leadership in bringing Canadians to share that vision. And there must always be space for those with expertise and experience to try to persuade others to step back and reflect on entrenched ways of doing things and to consider alternatives. This seems to be especially relevant to the shaping of Canada's roles and priorities within the emerging Asia Pacific regional order. Though the importance of the Asia Pacific region as a sphere of international economic and political activity has grown dramatically over the last twenty years, Canada has been relatively slow to take notice, remaining steadfastly fixated on the European theatre. Recently, through the sustained energy and ingenuity of various government officials, academics, corporations, and citizens' groups, Canadians have gradually come to recognize the Asia Pacific as an important context for foreign policy. Some have been attracted to the opportunities afforded by rapid economic growth in the region. Others are increasingly concerned about human rights and development in Eastern Asian societies. Yet few are familiar with the nature of their country's involvements in regional affairs, and there is widespread uncertainty about how Canada "fits" into the Asia Pacific community. When a democratic government takes a decision to re-orient its foreign policy toward new partners and new challenges—as the present federal government has done in putting new emphasis on its relations with the countries of Eastern Asia—that government must answer the challenge of building up public awareness and understanding of these new areas, presenting a clear view of possible risks and rewards, and

achieving a sustained and sophisticated dialogue with citizens on how to go forward. As John W. Holmes convincingly argued, "a good government both leads and follows public opinion."[1]

This paper attempts to draw attention to research and outreach activities that could support a strategy for domestic engagement on Canada's roles and priorities in the Asia Pacific region. Its findings and recommendations are based on a review of academic studies relating to the role of the public in the Canadian foreign policy-making process and on policy issues bearing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations, supplemented by a number of telephone or in-person interviews with government officials, academic specialists, and business and NGO representatives. Because of time constraints, and the relative scarcity of research in this area, the paper has only scratched the surface of a very large set of issues and controversies. It should therefore be understood as a *preliminary* study—collecting diverse and previously disconnected materials and setting a foundation for more extensive research—whose value is in its broad scope and integrative approach. The paper does not make specific recommendations on government policy in the regional context. Nor does it actually provide the kind of distillate of public inputs called for above. Rather, it presents an argument for the importance of integrating public input into the foreign policy process, and offers some insights and recommendations designed to enhance public awareness and set up constructive public engagement on Canada's Asia Pacific relations. It is not an argument for the creation of yet another new government agency, standing committee or government-sponsored research centre. Most of the resources required for the development and implementation of a strategy for engagement with the public on Canada's Asia Pacific relations are already in place, and lack only modest inputs of resources and creativity to sustain and coordinate their effective utilization in this regard. It is hoped that the project will be both useful and thought-provoking for government officials, academic and NGO specialists on Asia Pacific affairs, business executives considering extended trade or investment in the Asia Pacific region, and all of those interested in the broader question of the public's role in foreign policy-making in Canada.

The major findings and recommendations of the paper are outlined in the executive summary immediately following this introduction. Extended explanation and discussion of these findings are then provided in the nine sections of the paper itself. The first of these sections considers the role of public input in the foreign policy-making process in Canada, drawing on empirical and theoretical research from the U.S. and Canada, and pointing out some contemporary controversies.

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1. John W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy* (Toronto/Montreal: McLelland & Stewart, 1970), pp. 55-56.

It describes and evaluates the present government's efforts to expand the participatory mechanisms of the foreign policy-making process in Canada, and presents an argument for extending and refining these initiatives to achieve a more inclusive and effective participatory process. The second section presents a general overview of the bases, manifestations and controversies of Canada's growing involvement in the Asia Pacific region, with special attention to the role of different segments of the public in the design, implementation and oversight of government policy. Subsequent sections present policy-relevant observations and recommendations related to the extension of the participatory policy-making process for Canada's Asia Pacific relations through public opinion research, public education, news media coverage, research, government consultation with business and NGO representatives, and renewed efforts to engage with Asian Canadian communities (respectively). There are also five appendices to the report, providing recent opinion poll questions bearing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations, model questions for future survey research, an inventory of events associated with Canada's Year of Asia Pacific, non-government resources for future consultative initiatives, and references to concise policy research papers on Canada's roles and priorities within the Asia Pacific region.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The findings and recommendations of this paper are built on the proposition that, as with other kinds of government policy, foreign policy is most sound—in both instrumental and normative terms—when it is determined by experts working within and guided by an ongoing, informed, public dialogue. There has always been a fair amount of skepticism surrounding the idea of public input and public oversight within the foreign policy-making community in Canada. Over the last twenty years, however, the idea that those outside government can and should play a role in foreign policy-making has been appearing with greater frequency and greater prominence within the press releases and policy guidance documents of DFAIT, DND and CIDA. During the federal election of 1993, the Liberal Party platform included prominent references to a need to "democratize" the foreign policy process in Canada, and the Chretien government has attempted to deliver on this promise through—among other policies—a series of "outreach" initiatives, designed to extend and formalize government consultation with business, academics, NGOs and other segments of the "attentive public."

Meanwhile, the Chretien government has made clear its intention to follow up and extend the ongoing push toward deeper Canadian involvement in the Asia Pacific regional context, both in recent policy guidance documents such as the Parliamentary reports and Defence White Paper of 1994, and in subsequent diplomatic initiatives such as the "Team Canada" bilateral trade missions and participation in the evolving ASEAN Regional Forum. Along with these efforts to raise Canada's diplomatic profile among its Asia Pacific neighbours, this push toward the Pacific has also featured efforts both to build up government and academic expertise and to cultivate greater awareness of the region among the business community and general public. But, while official and academic analysts have devoted considerable energy to measuring the growth of Canadian expertise, evaluating specific diplomatic initiatives, and considering the balance between regional commitments and resources, there has been virtually no attention to the more basic question of whether or how regional policy reflects the goals and priorities of Canadians.

Policy Environment

As mentioned in the introduction, there is a basic consensus among Canada's Asia Pacific experts that the general public is increasingly aware of the importance of Eastern Asia for Canada, and that efforts to get Canadians thinking about their country as part of a larger "Asia Pacific" community seem to have been somewhat successful, but that most apparently still know very little about the specific controversies, opportunities, and risks presented by engagement in the region. There have

been few reliable, policy-relevant indicators of Canadian public opinion on foreign policy in general, and virtually none with specific focus on Asia Pacific context. There are clear indications, however, that the public wants government to do more to promote trade and create jobs in Canada, and to support human rights and sustainable development abroad, yet remains acutely concerned about government spending levels. Recent opinion polls conducted for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) suggest that Canadians do recognize Eastern Asia as an important arena for Canadian foreign policy, but have mixed feelings about widening trade relations with the countries of Eastern Asia, and see other regions as far more important for defence planning (Europe) and development assistance (Africa, Latin America). [2]

There is also general agreement among experts that Canadian news media coverage of Asia Pacific affairs has expanded and shown signs of increasing sophistication over the last twenty years, yet many believe that it remains inadequate to support and extend domestic awareness of the region. The business community in Canada has been engaged in the shaping of Asia Pacific policies, but has generally adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward various regional inter-governmental processes (e.g., APEC), and has not shown much interest in participating in government-sponsored multi-sectoral consultation or support for broad-based research on regional issues. Meanwhile, Canada's non-government organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly attentive to Asia Pacific affairs, particularly with regard to Canadian policy as it affects human rights and sustainable development within the region. Recently, some Canadian NGO and labour organizations have turned their attention to other aspects of expanded relations with Eastern Asia, particularly long-term job loss and social dislocations that could be caused by the anticipated liberalization of trans-Pacific trade and investment. Finally, through their technical expertise, networking and working relationships with government departments, business associations, and NGOs, academic specialists have not only played a direct role in developing Canadian policy with respect to Asia Pacific, but also established themselves as an important, integrative component for new kinds of consultative policy-setting and public oversight.

There have been a number of influential studies on the interactions of these non-government sectors within the foreign policy-making process, but most of this has been anecdotal, with rather shallow empirical foundations. [3] A small number of these have focused on some aspect of the foreign policy-making process with respect to Asia Pacific relations, such as Lawrence Woods'

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2. Refer to Appendix One.

3. See, for example: Dennis Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers: the Domestic Environment of the Foreign Policy Community" *International Journal* 26 (Winter 1970-1971): 221-248.

research on the pressures exerted by business associations and NGOs. [4] Overall, however, the accumulated research into non-government inputs into the making of Canada's Asia Pacific policies, particularly that bearing on those the "non-expert public," is limited, disconnected, and generally tending to raw description rather than analysis. This is particularly striking when considered in relation to the growing number of studies of the kind described in the introduction to this paper, which tend to concentrate on providing detailed updates on regional progress and perils and/or on suggesting new diplomatic strategies, without actually spelling out the goals and values upon which the latter are premised.

Policy Guidelines

Within this field of collected suppositions and disconnected studies, we can discern a number of paths, through cumulative research and outreach initiatives, toward a clearer and more confident sense of what Canadians know about, care about, worry about and want to achieve with respect to their place within the Asia Pacific region. These paths have been represented here as a set of five basic guidelines for research and consultative engagement.

First, government can continue to take advantage of opportunities to broaden the circle of those involved in the design and evaluation of Canada's Asia Pacific policies, to include not only government officials, business executives and academic specialists, but also non-government organizations and "ordinary Canadians" (non-experts).

Second, the focus in long-range planning should be on sustaining both government and non-government interest in the Asia Pacific regional context after the peak of activity surrounding the APEC leaders' meeting in Vancouver and Canada's Year of Asia Pacific (CYAP).

Third, policy-makers should concentrate on creating or refurbishing inexpensive, effective vehicles for consultative exchange. Two aspects of this process stand out: (a) experimenting with new forms of government/non-government exchange through the Internet, and (b) supporting new links between existing specialized research and information-sharing vehicles like the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC), the APEC Research and Information Network (APECRIN), and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS).

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4. Lawrence T. Woods, "The Business of Canada's Pacific Relations" *Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences* 4:4 (1987): 410-425.

Fourth, while maintaining and extending consultative relations with the business sector, government officials should engage with "civil society" associations and labour organizations now to address the burgeoning climate of domestic confrontation, and establish durable vehicles for dialogue on human rights, development, and the nature and pace of economic liberalization within the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, there must be a clear recognition that renewed commitments to a strengthened participatory process for foreign policy and to active engagement in Asia Pacific affairs each entail demand for sustained inputs of increasingly-pressured government resources (i.e., time and money). Successful domestic engagement on regional policy will require investment in long-term strategies whose pay-offs are hard to measure and hard to claim credit for, such as basic awareness among the non-expert public, policy-relevant research, and effective networking within the expert community.

Policy Recommendations

Within the context of this set of basic guidelines, the paper offers a series of specific policy recommendations, focusing on extending the efficacy of existing initiatives and relationships as vehicles for a participatory process. A more extensive explanation of the context and rationale for each of these recommendations is provided in the section noted in parentheses.

Develop a four-year polling strategy for tracking domestic awareness of and interest in Canada's roles and priorities within Asia Pacific region. Emphasis should be on maximizing the analytical value of collected data, through careful question selection and multivariate analyses, and on keeping track of familiarity and priority-setting. (Section Three)

Create a new "interactive" Internet site, providing outlines of Canadian policy priorities in the Asia Pacific region, offering basic news and analysis, listing relevant upcoming events, soliciting input on selected policy guidelines questions, and providing direct links to other government and non-government sites. (Section Three)

In partnership with the provinces, conduct a review of Canadian secondary school and university undergraduate curricula in history, politics, geography and business, to consider whether current research and training effectively reflects Canada's evolving relations with various geographic regions, and determine whether adequate resources are in place to correct significant distortions. Maintain funding and support for the APFC educational database program, and set aside additional resources for the generation and distribution of low-cost curriculum development materials for secondary schools, to be drafted by a small committee of non-government experts. (Section Three)

Maintain funding for the APFC's media assignment program, and encourage networking between mainstream journalists, Asian Canadian "ethnic" media organizations, and various Canadian academic, business and NGO experts. (Section Four)

Maintain support for existing non-government research and networking organizations—e.g., CANCAPS and the Canadian Member Committee of CSCAP, APFC, APECRIN—and, where appropriate, extend funding to provide for proposed outreach activities. Consider the development of a small, permanent, government-sponsored funding agency for research and outreach activities on Asia Pacific issues. Encourage participation by select business, media, and NGO representatives in CANCAPS. (Section Five)

Continue to encourage private sector participation in various kinds of government-led consultative initiatives and private sector sponsorship for research and outreach activities. Commission an independent write-in survey of Canadian business executives, focusing on their concerns regarding trade and direct investment in Eastern Asia and the strengths and weaknesses of relevant government and non-government support services (e.g., research, training, consular and trade commission services). Encourage application of the survey's results to the program planning of relevant government departments and non-government organizations like the APFC. (Section Six)

Continue to provide resources and information to Canadian NGOs with an interest in Asia Pacific issues, and to include "civil society" and labour organizations in consultative processes. (Chapter Seven)

Continue to encourage the recruitment of talented Asian Canadians in the Foreign Service and foreign policy-related government departments (i.e., DFAIT, DND, CIDA) and the participation of Asian Canadians in government-sponsored consultative processes. (Chapter Eight)

Begin building up the organizational base for a National Forum on Canada's International Relations focusing on Canada's roles and priorities within the Asia Pacific region, to be held within two to four years. Set up regional steering committees at least one year in advance, have initial contacts made with potential participants from business, news media, education and NGO sectors as soon as possible, and develop and distribute preparatory materials (i.e., "background" information on Canadian policies, controversies). (Section Nine)

Recommendations for Additional Research

As outlined in the introduction, most academic research in Canada on Asia Pacific issues has been confined to describing, explaining or forecasting shifting regional alignments and evolving multilateral fora. Some studies have also suggested means by which Canada could capture a larger share of the regional trade and investment market and/or help to nudge regional processes toward

"common security" or "open regionalism." Many have made a point of explaining why developments in the Asia Pacific region are of direct importance for Canada, and some explain their policy recommendations in terms of general goals and basic values which are ascribed to be essential to Canadians, but none have explicitly or rigourously worked out the connection between Canadian regional policy and the Canadian public. As highlighted above, the fact is that those who are designing and evaluating Canada's Asia Pacific policies don't really *know* very much about what various sectors of the public are aware of or want to achieve with respect to their country's involvement in the region. Each of the government and non-government experts interviewed for this project conceded that their ideas on the nature and saliency of public input with respect to Asia Pacific issues were based on impressionistic interpretations of relatively coarse, "indirect" indicators, such as news media coverage. This is not to say that every piece of policy research must trace its recommendations to a set of supporting opinion polls, but rather that the virtual absence of attention to the question of public awareness and public input has rendered the policy debate normatively barren and pragmatically unfocused (since it ignores important domestic incentives and constraints). Though the development of a regional strategy does not have to wait on the accumulation of empirical research on domestic preferences, a clearer picture of relevant aspects of public opinion, public participation and governmental decision-making in contemporary Canada could lead to a more constructive domestic dialogue and thereby to more effective regional policies. A number of research projects suggest themselves:

At the most basic level, there is a need for extensive theoretical and empirical study of the evolving Canadian foreign policy-making process, with specific attention to the development of government "outreach" programs and extended engagement with NGOs, in order to update the influential studies of the 1970s and 1980s. [5] This research could be augmented with detailed empirical evaluation of the impacts of recent government-sponsored consultative initiatives—such as the 1994 parliamentary reviews of defence and foreign policy and the annual National Forum on Canada's International Relations series—on actual policy statements and actions, based on interviews, document content analysis, and policy case studies.

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5. Here the author has in mind the following: J.W. Holmes, *The Better Part of Valour*, ch. 5; D. Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers," and Dennis Stairs "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy" *International Journal* 33 (Winter 1977-78): 128-149; David B. Dewitt & John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto: Wiley, 1983), chs. 1,5; Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus" *International Journal* 31:1 (1983-84): 93-125.

In contrast to the impressive array of research on public opinion as it relates to Canadian federal elections, there is a profound shortage of broad-based quantitative research into public opinion polling as it relates to the Canadian foreign policy process. This is of course even more profound with respect to the Asia Pacific context, wherein poll data is scarce and loosely comparable at best. Systematic study of existing public opinion in Canada could nevertheless be used to set up a useful template for future research and poll planning.

As outlined in Section Four, an empirical study of Canadian news media coverage of the Asia Pacific region conducted in 1988 suggested that it was relatively infrequent, simplistic, and reliant on foreign sources. [6] Yet many experts believe that Canadian coverage of Eastern Asia has expanded and improved over the last ten years. Updated research could not only support or question this impression, but also provide us with a rough indication of the efficacy of recent efforts to enhance Canadian news coverage. Research of this kind could also be supported by theoretically-grounded empirical study of the impacts of news media coverage on public attitudes and activism with respect to specific foreign policy crises, based on Asia Pacific case studies (i.e., 1989 Tiannanmen Square confrontation, North Korea's covert nuclear weapon program, environmental consequences of China's "Three Gorges" development project). Attention should be given to comparison of the content and orientation of Asia Pacific coverage by mainstream Canadian news media and "ethnic media" organizations catering to Asian Canadian communities.

Efforts to bring Asian Canadians more effectively into the foreign policy process could also be supported by comparative sociological study of political activism within Asian Canadian communities and Asian Canadian political participation, with particular emphasis on attention to foreign policy issues like immigration, trade policy, and regional security cooperation.

Finally, research on the dynamics of public input should be linked with new work on the way it is processed by government. There is therefore a need for formal survey research on the attitudes of Canadian foreign policy officials (DFAIT, DND, CIDA) with respect to the accuracy, sophistication, importance, sources, and consequences of public input into foreign policy. Similar research has been conducted in the U.S. context, and could be a suitable model for Canadian investigators. [7]

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6. This research could be designed to update a 1988/1992 study by Marc Beliveau and Georges Payastre, described in Section Three of this paper.

7. Refer to the study by Phillip Powlick, outlined in Section One (below).

ONE

A "BOTTOM-UP" APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

The Public and Foreign Policy-Making: Research Themes & Controversies

Most research on public input into the making of foreign policy has been conducted by American academics and focused on the U.S. context. [8] This is likely a reflection of the sheer size of the policy research community in the U.S., the intensity of public controversy surrounding the country's major foreign policy engagements, and the ongoing contestation between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy decision-making. Through most of this century, there has been a fairly stable consensus among academics and policy-makers in the U.S. that the electorate was basically "irrational" when it came to foreign policy issues—given to unpredictable mood swings between clumsy aggression and complete introversion—and that government leaders were therefore compelled to isolate themselves from the sway of public opinion. [9] This deeply-rooted skepticism about public input in foreign policy-making was reflected in, and supported, the basic "realist" argument that successful foreign policy (and indeed higher levels of international security) could be charted only by elite groups of experts, operating above the fray of domestic politics, dispassionately divining and pursuing an objectively-identifiable "national interest." [10]

Over the last twenty years, however, empirical studies by U.S. scholars have indicated that public attitudes toward foreign policy are in fact fairly stable and generally consistent with those of government decision-makers, though not particularly sophisticated or well-informed. [11] This counter-argument fits well with the basic "liberal" premise that democratic countries are less

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8. Key examples include: Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus" *International Studies Quarterly* 36:4 (December 1992): 439-466—refer esp. to the excellent bibliography; Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Bruce M. Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); David D. Newsom, *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Bloomington, IN; Indiana University Press, 1996).

9. O. Holsti, "Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," pp. 439-445.

10. The classic expression of this way of thinking is: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, Fifth Edition, 1978), esp. pp. 552-558; Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922).

11. B. Page & R. Shapiro, *The Rational Public*, esp. chs. 1, 2, 5, 6; O. Holsti, "Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus"; Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force" *International Studies Quarterly* 36:1 (March 1992): 49-74.

warlike than non-democratic ones because a rational public will restrain aggressive leaders. [12] It also fits with the legacy of America's failed intervention in Vietnam—a dramatic undercutting of the public's confidence in a strong, "presidential" style of foreign policy-making. One of the consequences of both the Vietnam experience and the gradual entrenchment of liberal thinking has been an "opening" of the foreign policy-making process to various forms of public input, including polling, consultation, and open fora. Indeed, a recent survey by Phillip Powlick, based on interviews with dozens of U.S. State Department and National Security Council (NSC) officials, suggests that even relatively cloistered foreign policy bureaucrats have come to accept public oversight—if not necessarily public input—as an essential element of successful foreign policy. [13]

The Canadian Context

Empirical or theoretical research on the role of the public within the foreign policy-making process in Canada is relatively scarce. [14] Rigourous studies of public opinion on foreign policy issues in Canada have been rare, and generally focused on specific events or controversies. [15] And there have been no studies of Canadian foreign policy officials' attitudes toward public input to parallel Powlick's U.S. study. [16]

Though there are superficial similarities in the way that public input into foreign policy-making has been thought about, argued about, and politically managed in Canada and the United States, there are also important historical, geostrategic, and social divergences between the two countries

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12. O. Holsti, "Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," pp. 440-441.

13. Phillip J. Powlick, "The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:4 (December 1991): 611-641.

14. Refer to: D. Stairs, "Publics and Policy-Makers"; D. Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs"; D.B. Dewitt & J.J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*: (1983), esp. chs. 5, 1; Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, Third Edition, 1997), esp. chs. 4, 5.

15. See, for example: Paul Evans & Daphne Gottlieb Taras, *Canadian Public Opinion on Relations with China: An Analysis of the Existing Survey Research* (Toronto: JCAPS, 1985); Don Munton & Timothy M. Shaw, "Apartheid and Canadian Public Opinion" *International Perspectives* (September/October 1987): 9-12; R.H. MacDermid, "Public Opinion Polling and Canadian Involvement in the Gulf War" (paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association; Charlottetown, PEI; June 2, 1992). There have of course also been dozens of published and unpublished analyses of specific polls or poll series prepared by or for DFAIT, DND, or CIDA.

16. Such a study would answer a number of related questions of particular interest to Canadian scholars and officials, including the degree to which career bureaucrats' assessments of public input coincide with those of elected officials, and is therefore highly recommended. Refer to: Phillip J. Powlick, "The American Foreign Policy Process and the Public" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1990).

that bring the straightforward application of U.S. research to the Canadian context into question.[17] As a relatively "small" state, dependent on stable patterns of international trade and investment, Canada's range of choice as a foreign policy actor is relatively limited, and these constraints have manifest themselves in a tendency toward a "technical" perspective on foreign policy-making, among both government officials and the general public. Though it has had its share of intense foreign policy controversies (e.g., the Conscription Crisis), Canada has not recently endured a foreign policy-driven domestic crisis to parallel America's Vietnam War experience. Moreover, as an international actor, Canada has been torn between incentives for activism, based in part on its dependence on international trade, and an impulse to introversion, based in large part on its geographic distance from areas of turmoil and its ongoing confederal/constitutional crisis.[18] Finally, the government foreign policy-making structure in Canada is significantly different from that of the United States, featuring a higher level of emphasis on bureaucratic expertise and a much lower level of legislative oversight. Each of these kinds of differences has been studied at length elsewhere, but very little work has gone into determining the consequences of these differences for the role of non-governmental inputs in foreign policy-making.[19] Further empirical and theoretical research on the contemporary foreign policy process is therefore sorely needed, particularly as it may relate to the historical evolution of government officials' attitudes toward public input and non-government actors' ability to engage in constructive criticism and policy option development, as well as the rootedness of both in contemporary political currents and structures.

The existing body of research on public input into foreign policy-making in Canada does point to a number of relevant trends and controversies. Canadians have—with a few exceptions—historically been content to leave foreign policy in the hands of professional bureaucrats and the governing executive. Meanwhile, government officials have generally taken

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17. There are a number of good comparative works on the role of the public in foreign policy making, but none (to the author's knowledge) specifically featuring Canada. For example: Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies" *World Politics* 43:4 (July 1991): 479-512; Bernard C. Cohen, *Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the Netherlands* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).

18. K.R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, pp. 292-295, 22-29.

19. Partial exceptions include the discussion of the consequences of the evolving structure of the government foreign policy establishment on public input in D.B. Dewitt & J.J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, pp. 195-232, and Andrew F. Cooper, "Trying to Get it Right: The Foreign Ministry and Organizational Change in Canada" (paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 19-22 1997; cited with permission), and the discussion of Parliament's role in Kim Richard Nossal, "The Democratization of Foreign Policy?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1:3 (Fall 1993): 95-105, pp. 99-102.

the view that, when it comes to foreign policy, the public has little interest and less knowledge, and that it is entirely appropriate for foreign policy decisions to be made by dedicated experts with little or no input from society. Over the last twenty years, however, there has been a steady erosion of both the public's passive-permissive attitude and the government foreign policy-making establishment's contented isolation. As in the United States, scholars and editorialists in Canada have increasingly argued that if only government would pay heed to the public, it would surely find its way to correct foreign policy priorities (though these writers often have radically different sets of priorities in mind). [20] Among the recent developments exerting pressure for a new "openness" in foreign policy-making in Canada have been the controversy surrounding the Mulroney government's close alignment with the United States, the rise of new populist parties (the Reform Party and the Bloc Quebecois), and the growth of professionalized internationalist NGOs. [21]

Popular discontentment with what was widely perceived as an especially "closed" approach to foreign policy-making on the part of the Mulroney government was effectively captured in the Liberal Party's 1993 campaign platform, and particularly in the speeches and writings of foreign affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy. [22] As Minister for Foreign Affairs, Axworthy has since attempted to fulfill promises to render the foreign policy-making process more "democratic," through national reviews of Defence and Foreign Policy, provision for parliamentary debate on major foreign policy issues, various *ad hoc* consultations between government officials and non-government experts, youth conferences, and annual National Fora on Canada's International Relations. But what does it mean to make the foreign policy-making process more "democratic"? What constitutes an accurate reflection of the public's values and expectations? And how are we to evaluate government efforts to determine what the Canadian public wants and translate it into action?

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20. One of the clearest arguments for strengthening participatory features of the foreign policy-making process in Canada is: Franklyn Griffiths, "Opening Up the Policy Process" (pp. 110-118), in Stephen Clarkson (ed.), *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968).

21. K.R. Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?" esp. p. 95. Tim Draimin & Betty Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy" (pp. 63-82), in Maxwell A. Cameron & Maureen Appel Molot (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995).

22. Lloyd Axworthy, "Canadian Foreign Policy: A Liberal Party Perspective" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1:1 (Winter 1992/93): 7-15. See also: "Foreign Policy Handbook" (May 1993), a collection associated with the Liberal "Red Book"—*Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada* (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993).

Achieving a More Participatory Foreign Policy Process

A number of observers have expressed skepticism concerning the Chretien government's efforts to "democratize" the foreign policy-making process. Kim Richard Nossal, for example, begins by pointing to the fact that the Canadian system is already democratic, since citizens can translate their support or contempt for the government's foreign policy decisions into political results through voting or through constituency pressure on their legislative representatives. He also notes that this mechanism has been supplemented over the years by a variety of supporting features, including parliamentary inquiries, periodic opinion polling, and *ad hoc* consultations with academic, business, and NGO experts. [23] Yet the historical record suggests that the primary mechanisms of democratic foreign policy oversight are rarely exercised as such. Is it therefore reasonable to assume that Canadians have consistently understood and approved of virtually all of the many foreign policy actions undertaken on their behalf? It seems more likely that many Canadians are politically passive with respect to foreign policy issues because the subordination of the legislature by the executive in the parliamentary system dramatically undercuts the efficacy of citizen activism, except where it coincides with pressure by a clear and politically-coordinated majority. The individual voter therefore often has few incentives to actively seek out independent information and become engaged with government on foreign policy issues, even in cases where he or she may be directly affected by policy decisions.

In this light, the explosive growth of non-government advocacy groups within Canada (and elsewhere) over the last forty years can be seen as an ongoing attempt by citizens to break down collective action problems and exert leverage within the context of an inadequately-responsive set of democratic mechanisms. This flowering of non-government associations—community advocacy groups, "civil society" organizations, business associations, etc.—both reflects and reinforces a radical re-alignment of the way that Canadian government policy is designed and implemented, in both domestic and international contexts. In fact, the central feature of the present government's efforts to "democratize" the foreign policy-making process has been an effort to engage with various kinds of non-government associations, particularly through a series of high-profile "outreach" initiatives that bring together representatives from academia, business, and various civil society organizations to exchange views and develop policy options. Though as yet underdeveloped, these initiatives harbour the potential for a more inclusive and more effectively responsive participatory process for foreign policy-making that taps into growing non-government technical expertise, provides for new kinds of transnational coordination, creates new space for

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23. K.R. Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?" pp. 97-99, 102-104.

policy based on ethical or humanitarian concerns, and could eventually catalyse progress toward a broader and better-informed policy dialogue within the general public. [24]

On the other hand, Nossal has argued that Axworthy and others favouring this kind of "opening" of the process have confused democracy with mere *participation*, and that the partial extension of participation within the process may not only be a poor substitute for democracy, but actually contrary to it, in the sense that it simply sets up a new self-rationalizing variant of elite decision-making. [25] He characterizes these initiatives as little more than calculated political expediency, designed to win support from what some have called an emerging "conferencing class" of non-government experts and activists. There is certainly an element of truth in this, but it disguises a much more complicated political landscape and a good deal of latent promise within these developments.

"Participation" is not so much a poor alternative to democracy as it is a complex variable by which we can measure the pursuit of democracy. Foreign policy decision-making systems are *more or less* participatory—more or less amenable to various kinds of public input and oversight, more or less able to level the playing field for those with less money or organizational coherence, and more or less effective in translating the jumble of sometimes-contradictory inputs into a popular and effective set of policy outputs. A more effectively participatory process collects and integrates inputs from a broader segment of society, and thereby resists colonization by small groups, taps into a relatively complex pool of skills and experiences, contributes to a stable base of political legitimacy, and reproduces itself through higher levels of public awareness and interest in policy issues.

In order to clarify these ideas and put them into context with respect to relevant challenges and limitations, they are considered below with reference to recent government efforts to strengthen existing participatory mechanisms. As outlined during the 1993 election campaign, [26] the Chretien government's commitment to a more effectively participatory foreign policy process has involved three main components: a) providing new openings for consultation with citizens and NGOs, and extended efforts to bring consultation with business into more open, institutionalized settings; b) continuing the extensive opinion polling set out by the Mulroney government; and c) making

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24. T. Draimin & B. Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy," pp. 66-73.

25. K.R. Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?" pp. 102, 101.

26. K.R. Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?" L. Axworthy, "Canadian Foreign Policy."

space for parliamentary debate on foreign policy issues, and initiating new parliamentary investigations and reviews.

Predictably, efforts to reinvigorate the role of Parliament in foreign policy-making, through extended debate and the formation of new investigative committees, have provided little more than an opportunity for elected representatives to show off how much (or how little) they know about foreign policy issues. As Nossal and others have pointed out, Parliament has always had the "right" to debate foreign policy issues, but rarely exercises it because of the relative weight of domestic issues and the structural restraints of party discipline—indeed, creating a meaningful role for Parliament in foreign policy decision-making would probably require a reconstitution of the very structure of political incentives and restrictions that makes up the Canadian system of governance. [27] There are, however, important roles for Parliament in the development of a more participatory foreign policy process, including the conduct of public inquiries and the continuing play of partisan debate on pressing issues, both in the House and in the public arena. As Canada's demographic map changes, and the boundary between domestic politics and foreign policy continues to blur, there may be increasing pressure on individual Members to act as direct conduits between their constituencies and Cabinet on policy issues like human rights, immigration and refugees, developmental assistance and humanitarian aid, and participation in international treaties and diplomatic fora. This could mean that "international" issues were more frequently on the parliamentary agenda, but the nature of the system will consistently dampen the potential for sustained debate, let alone meaningful and constructive contestation between legislature and executive. [28]

A cursory review of recent opinion polling on international issues suggests increased attention to issue-familiarity and general priority-setting, with less fixation on approval-monitoring than under the Mulroney government. [29] Regardless of any marginal improvements over the last few years, departmental officials interviewed for this paper reported little confidence in polls as a guide for decision-making, on the grounds that their scope is too general and their results too abstracted from "real-world" trade-offs and constraints. However, certain types of opinion polling and focus

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27. K.R. Nossal, "The Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy?" pp. 99-101.

28. On Parliament's role(s) in foreign policy-making, refer to the "pessimistic" discussion in K.R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, ch. 10, and the relatively "optimistic" discussion in David Taras, "From Bystander to Participant" (pp. 3-19), in David Taras (ed.), *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: CIIA, 1985).

29. This observation is based on a review of public opinion question indexes and archival datasets. Refer to Section Three and Appendix One.

group research could play an important supporting role in the development of participatory mechanisms. If the shift from approval-monitoring to tracking public awareness and general policy preferences were extended, with the latter framed in terms of ranked priorities and realistic policy trade-offs, the results could be used to set up a baseline for measuring the effectiveness of government strategies for promoting public awareness and interest, as well as giving departmental officials a clearer picture of the public "mood." (These issues will be taken up again in Section Three of this paper.)

It is the substantial extension of government consultative initiatives that is most likely to restructure the role that the public—in its many forms—will play in the making of Canadian foreign policy, and it is this set of initiatives that will be the central focus of the remainder of this research paper. Taken together, these "outreach" programs have the look of what political theorists would call a corporatist decision-making structure, but with some important differences. First, the capital segment remains a reluctant participant, with large firms and business associations preferring to stick with traditionally comfortable bilateral relations with high-level government officials, and smaller firms unconvinced that the process is worth the investment of scarce time and money. [30] Second, the labour segment of the model is folded into a new "non-government organization (NGO)" category, which holds little leverage within the process, except where it has special experience or expertise and/or where it has built up credibility as an agent of the public conscience. Academic experts have also played an increasingly "direct" role in the foreign policy-making process through consultative fora, both through technical and analytical contributions and through the function of policy research as a practical connection between government and business and/or NGO concerns. Finally, there have been unprecedented efforts to include "ordinary" (non-expert) citizens in direct consultation and policy development, through focus groups, conferences and roundtables.

Basically, there have been two kinds of skepticism about the appropriateness and effectiveness of multi-sectoral consultative fora and public review processes as vehicles for public input in foreign policy-making. First, there is the argument that, despite whatever efforts are made to render them "generally representative," consultative fora of this kind will reflect only the views of a relatively small (albeit relatively varied) set of special interest groups, and therefore set up only a new kind of elite decision-making. Though any participatory process which features expert dialogue and mediated accommodation between organized groups can lead to the isolation of the general public

30. Andrew F. Cooper, "Trying to Get it Right," pp. 20, 13-14.

and/or the trampling of small or disorganized groups, these dangers can be effectively minimized through counter-balancing strategies designed to integrate non-expert members of the general public, publicize the outcomes of consultative processes and monitor the effective accountability of "representative" non-government groups. As Canadian NGOs proliferate, and their role continues to shift from critical oversight to constructive policy option development, internal and external pressures for accountability are expected to eventually transform them into more effective and responsive conduits between government and their "constituencies." [31]

Ultimately, government will have to look to its own mandate, and make effective use of various measures of public opinion at its disposal, in order to strike a balance between various sources of input. This does not mean that each and every consultative event must achieve balanced representation from each of the various sectors of society (academics, business, NGOs, ethnocultural groups, etc.), but that the whole process must be perceived to be balanced, by both government and non-government participants. This sense of "balance" is the key to the effectiveness of this kind of participatory policy-making. If government officials believe that the process captures a reasonably accurate reflection of the views of Canadian society as a whole, then they will find it harder to dismiss its inputs as those of some "special interest," and will gain a new confidence in everyday decision-making that the potential for unexpected negative public reaction has been minimized. If citizens see the process in the same way, and have seen demonstrations of its effect on policy-making, then—almost by definition—they will have more confidence in government decisions and be more interested in participation (not to mention having fewer qualms about whatever expense is associated with the process).

Achieving a balance between sources of public input will require more than just setting quotas for different sectors in drawing up invitations for consultative events. It will require a complex strategy for public engagement that makes use of a variety of different media and fora, involving a genuinely reciprocal exchange of information and views, in both short-term and long-term contexts. In this regard, it is recommended that government pursue a dual track approach to public engagement. On one hand, the government should continue to direct the bulk of its energy and resources to initiatives for immediate, ongoing, direct contact and exchange with various segments of the public, including *ad hoc* and regular multi-sectoral consultation, and periodic parliamentary review. While foreign policy decision-makers should maintain and extend regular contact with experts and "stakeholder" organizations, they should also make room for the views

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31. T. Draimin & B. Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy," pp. 65-66.

of previously-marginalized groups and "ordinary" Canadians, by extending an open invitation to participate in selected local and national fora. On the other hand, attention and resources must be devoted to long-term efforts to stimulate awareness of foreign policy issues and cultivate the bases for informed dialogue and constructive debate within Canadian society, as through the enhancement of public school curricula, the extension of news media coverage, the promotion of policy research and networking, and focused opinion survey research.

The second kind of skepticism regarding multi-sectoral consultative fora is underpinned by the perception that they do not generate recommendations that can have a meaningful impact on the foreign policy process. On one hand, because of lack of preparation and support and/or the need to bring a diverse group to consensus, the "results" of these fora have so far been too abstract or imprecise to be of any use in day-to-day policy-making. On the other hand, since participants' ideas about foreign policy priorities are often radically divergent (if not actually contradictory), government officials are left to choose among options in much the same way they would without the consultative process. The process becomes, in effect, merely an exercise in public relations, wherein the government fulfills its commitment to listen, but retains plenty of latitude in decision-making (as well as the option not to decide) and room to explain virtually any policy decision as the direct result of public consultation, even if it is directly contrary to the preferences of some of the participants. [32]

As the process matures, however, experienced participants will undoubtedly demand more comprehensive preparatory information and more extensive feedback from government sponsors as a precondition for their continued participation, enhancing the sophistication of their contributions and making it easier for them to effectively track their impact on policy decisions. Government will still be able to make some easy choices, but there will also be new pressure to define existing policies, to choose between contradictory recommendations, and to explain choices to participants. Some analysts will argue that such a process would be unnecessarily divisive, and would give too much weight to the complaints of small but vocal groups of dissenters. It is true that a mature consultative process would almost certainly draw latent disagreements to the surface, but this is precisely what effectively participatory decision-making process is supposed to do. While the achievement of an "across-the-board" consensus is an unrealistic and probably misguided goal for multi-sectoral consultative processes, there is still substantial scope within the process for recognizing and reinforcing common principles and purposes, and for negotiating

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32. Refer to the reflections on diversity, consensus and governmental freedom-of-maneuver in: D. Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs," pp. 135-136.

trade-offs and compromises. Thus, the guiding principle for participants in government outreach fora should be to uncover whatever consensus is actually out there (and no more), but also to uncover and explore as many policy-relevant disagreements as time and energy will allow.

Investing in "Bottom-Up" Foreign Policy-Making

As mentioned above, skeptics have drawn attention to the high costs—in terms of both time and money—and the limited utility of the "results" of outreach initiatives. Parliamentary debate on foreign policy issues has been a refreshing change, but its apparently limited impact on foreign policy decision-making has left many wondering whether it has been worth the time taken from an already cramped legislative schedule. Public opinion polling on foreign policy issues is also expensive, and often seems to serve no purpose other than in partisan image-management or inter-departmental competition for Cabinet support. Though few will say so plainly, there are many—both in and out of government—who plainly think that efforts to include the public in foreign policy-making are not worth the time and trouble. [33]

Yet the brief history of government "outreach" and other public input initiatives is better understood as an ongoing learning exercise, an awkward but necessary transition from a relatively "closed" process dominated by government experts to a relatively "open" process drawing on the inputs of all facets of an increasingly diverse and internationally-oriented society. On another level, it represents the gradual adaptation of DFAIT, DND, CIDA and other government agencies —and their Cabinet representatives—to a new political environment characterized by a disintegrating boundary between "domestic" and "foreign" policies, new international complexity, reduced departmental budgets for research and analysis, the dispersion of expertise to other sectors (i.e., business, NGOs), and the need to develop new political constituencies. [34] These initiatives should therefore not be understood in terms of simple costs and benefits, but as an *investment* of time and money in an evolving process, a new model for decision-making that Canadians will increasingly recognize as more legitimate and more effective. However, as with all investments, if the initial inputs are inadequate or the follow-through is weak, then the enterprise will fail and the effort will be for nothing. The recommendations presented in subsequent sections of this report have therefore been drafted with special attention to ensuring that existing investments toward the

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33. The question of costs associated with national consultative processes is raised, but not developed, in: Dennis Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3:1 (Spring 1995): 91-116, pp. 115-116.

34. Some of these issues and developments are discussed in: A.F. Cooper, "Trying to Get it Right."

creation of an effective participatory process for Canada's involvement in Asia Pacific security cooperation achieve their full potential.

TWO
CANADA AND THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Approaching "the Pacific Century" [35]

Eastern Asia is now widely recognized as an area of enormous economic and cultural dynamism, poised to play a central role in world politics through the foreseeable future. At the same time, the persistence of territorial disputes, high levels of military spending, underdeveloped mechanisms for conflict resolution, and questions about some states' commitments to human rights and the rule of law have made it a focus for continuing concern within the international community. As Canada and the United States gradually devote more of their attention to the countries of Eastern Asia, new patterns of intensive interaction—both cooperative and conflictual—have been established, reinforcing conceptions of an emergent *Asia Pacific* regional context. [36]

Canada Looks Across the Pacific

Canadian attention to the Asia Pacific region has expanded rapidly over the last ten years. Among the various manifestations of this new attention are:

the emergence of the region as a focus within recent government policy statements, including the submissions and responses to the 1994 Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews; [37]

the gradual extension of Canadian news media coverage of Asia Pacific regional affairs;

the growing number of Canadian academic experts focusing on Eastern Asian culture, society and regional relations, and the consequent increase in the number and variety of history,

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35. A number of studies have adopted this phrase to describe an expected shift of international dynamism from the European context to the Asia Pacific region. See, for example: Staffan Burenstan Linder, *The Pacific Century: Economic and Political Consequences of Asia Pacific Dynamism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986). Charles J. MacMillan, "Canada, Asia, and the Pacific Century" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 538 (1995): 96-114.

36. The geographic bounds and political meanings of the region are the subject of ongoing debate within and between nearly all countries concerned. There is, however, widespread recognition of intensive connections between Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and North America, with secondary layers of interaction between this core area and the countries of South Asia, the South Pacific and Latin America. Canadian diplomats, in contrast to their counterparts from Northeast and Southeast Asia, have tended to include South Asia within their working concept of the region.

37. For a brief analysis of these brief references, see: Frank Langdon, "Asia Pacific in the Foreign and Defence Policy Reports" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 5 (January 1995): 10-11. See also: *Canada and the World: Government Statement* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995), pp. 5-9, 16-17, 30-31.

politics, communications, arts, and business courses with a focus on the Asia Pacific region that are available to Canadian students;

the increasing recognition by Canadian business of Eastern Asia as second only to the United States as a source of market opportunity *and* competition; [38]

the enhanced vigour and intensity of Canadian NGO activity surrounding Canadian government policies and commercial activities bearing on human rights protection and sustainable development in Eastern Asia, and on the potential consequences of expanded relations with Eastern Asia for Canadian society;

the growing number of manifestations of public interest in Eastern Asian politics and culture (both contemporary and historical), from popular films to cuisine to consumer products.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the growing number of immigrants to Canada from Asia, most of the attention that Canadians devote to international affairs remains riveted on Europe, and the pace of our creation of new links with Eastern Asia seems to be falling behind that of countries like the United States and Australia. And, though the government now pays much more attention to the Asia Pacific region than it did ten years ago, the "balance" of government resources between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres is still far from balanced. Even over the last few years, observers have tended to describe Canadian engagement with the countries of Eastern Asia as episodic and disjointed, [39] involving four effectively-separate axes: cultural, political/humanitarian, security, and commercial. Each of these four axes has featured distinctive forms of inter-governmental relations with other Asia Pacific countries and distinctive forms of contact between the Canadian government and various segments of society.

Canada's *cultural relations* with Asia Pacific countries have been conducted primarily through the private sector, with sponsorship and support for Canadian cultural products from the federal and provincial governments and from various public or private institutes and associations. Public input into trans-Pacific cultural policy has largely been confined to direct *ad hoc* contacts between government and private cultural or communications firms, artisan's associations, and Asian Canadian community associations. Cultural relations lie outside of the immediate scope of this report, which is interested primarily in aspects of Canada's foreign policy directly bearing on the

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38. Refer to Appendix One, Table 1.6.

39. Leonard J. Edwards, "Asia Pacific Will Remain High on Government's Agenda" (excerpts from a presentation to CMC/CSCAP-CANCAPS meeting, Toronto, December 2, 1994) *CANCAPS Bulletin* 5 (January 1995), pp. 10-11.

emergence of multilateral political institutions within the Asia Pacific region. (Nevertheless, it is clear that cultural relations are closely related to commercial policies and diplomacy. Further study of these linkages is therefore recommended.)

Direct *political engagement on human rights and sustainable development issues* in the Asia Pacific context has almost exclusively taken the form of traditional inter-state diplomacy, conducted by high-level government officials, with indirect contributions from senior academics and selected business or NGO representatives. Canadian NGOs' direct linkages with other organizations or governments in the region have grown rapidly, however, and there are signs of a new capacity for independent "society-to-society" contacts. There are indications that the general public in Canada is aware of the controversy surrounding human rights violations in places like China and Indonesia, but few manifestations of popular demand for action by the Canadian government, and few signs of consciousness of the complex linkages between these issues and the "bigger picture" of regional relations. Nevertheless, it is clear that Canadians do have strong feelings about human rights and sustainable development in general, and that these feelings apply as much to Eastern Asia as any other region.

Canada's involvement in Asia Pacific *security affairs* is essentially derivative from the general push to establish itself as a significant player in the regional community—primarily through the strengthening of multilateral institutions for regional cooperation—and from concern that certain types of developments within the region could have negative consequences for Canada. Among these potential developments of concern are military expansionism, the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, environmental degradation, disruption of present or future commercial links, and uncontrolled migration. To date, Canadian engagement on regional security affairs has been conducted primarily through traditional diplomatic channels, with academic specialists and business executives making important advisory contributions to government and direct inputs into regional dialogue through unofficial ("track two") diplomacy. Dialogue on Asia Pacific security issues in the domestic context has been limited almost exclusively to a small group of academic specialists and government officials, with recent efforts to inform and engage with the business and NGO communities. These efforts have been supported by a broadening of the working definition of "security"—also reflected in official regional dialogue—to include issues previously considered in terms of economics or domestic politics. Awareness of and interest in regional security politics on the part of the general public apparently remains strictly limited.

The central focus of the Canadian government's attention to the Asia Pacific region, however, has overwhelmingly been *trans-Pacific trade and investment*. The Canadian government has been an active participant in dialogue on the pace and nature of regional integration, particularly the "open" and "rule-based" liberalization of trade and investment, pursued most prominently through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). This regional engagement on trade and investment issues has been paired with efforts directed at domestic engagement, encouraging Canadian businesses to take advantage of new opportunities within the rapidly growing markets of Eastern Asia. In recent years, efforts to engage with a broader base of the Canadian business community, and Canadian society in general, have been fueled by a new sense of urgency, stemming from indications that, while the volume of Canada's trade with Eastern Asia has increased in absolute terms, its relative share of the growing regional pie has actually decreased.[40] Moreover, several non-government experts interviewed conveyed a perception that this focus on promoting commercial linkages in the region has tended to sideline other important aspects of Canada's Asia Pacific relations, in the way that government conceives, presents, and pursues regional goals. There is a danger that this distortion will undercut the basis for cultivating a broad public dialogue on purposes and priorities, the government's ability to design and adapt regional policy, and Canada's credibility as a valuable and committed member of the regional community.

Engaging with Canadian Society on Asia Pacific Issues

A successful long-term strategy for Asia Pacific regional engagement must strive for a balance between these four axes, even while it endeavours to break down the conceptual and practical divisions between them. Aside from tapping into the growing body of research that explores the intersections and interactions between culture, social relations, diplomacy, security and economics in the region, government policy-makers would be well-served by efforts to create new levels of "cross-fertilization" among representatives of government, academia, business, NGOs, and the general public. While there will continue to be a need for policy-makers to harness specialized functional expertise on specific technical questions, the development of a broader strategy to guide comprehensive policy-making should take advantage of the varied skills and experiences of the widest possible cross-section of Canadian society.

The relative underdevelopment of public input mechanisms for Canada's Asia Pacific relations, particularly of those that feature non-experts and NGOs, is a clear challenge for government in designing and building support for regional policy. But the scarcity of the kinds of traditional

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40. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, *Canada Asia Review 1997* (Vancouver: APFC, 1997), p. 9.

vehicles for policy research and debate that are now entrenched within the contexts of (for example) European security and Third World development can also be seen as an *opportunity* for government to experiment with new approaches to public education, public opinion monitoring, consultation, and policy research.

THREE
PUBLIC OPINION, PUBLIC EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC INPUT

Appendix One presents selected results from a search for recent public opinion poll questions and results bearing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations. The search included public data archives storing survey research conducted by the Angus Reid Group, Decima Research, the Gallup Organization, and Roper/Starch Research, as well as a small number of recent poll analyses prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. [41] Not surprisingly, it uncovered only a few questions bearing on specific aspects of Canada's involvement in Asia Pacific affairs. Though the results of this preliminary search are not broad enough to support a more complete analysis of public views on Canada's Asia Pacific relations, a few aspects of the results are noteworthy.

First, a rough catalogue of Angus Reid, Gallup and Decima poll archival holdings for the period 1985-1995, found that, of the questions on foreign policy or international relations referring to specific regions or countries, less than ten percent indicated any specific focus on countries or issues associated with the Asia Pacific region. [42]

Second, Roper/Starch poll data and analyses reviewed indicate a base of support among respondents—albeit a fairly weak and somewhat qualified one—for expanding trade with the countries of Eastern Asia. Table 1.10 shows 46% agreeing "somewhat," and 31% agreeing "strongly," with participation in a 17-nation Pacific Rim trade "alliance" (presumably APEC). In Table 1.11, slightly lower numbers (40%, 23% respectively) agree that Canada should support the development of this "alliance" into a regional free trade agreement. In another poll (Table 1.5), most respondents felt that trade with selected Eastern Asian states was either "too much" or "about right"—relatively few replied that Canada had "not enough" trade with Japan (16%), China (19%), Korea (12%), Taiwan (10%) and Indonesia (14%).

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41. The search was conducted through the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (CSPO) at Queen's University, the Data Library at the University of British Columbia, and the DFAIT research library. DFAIT poll analyses were provided by the Communications Bureau, DFAIT. Sources for specific questions and data cited are provided in Appendix One.

42. This cursory review was based on archival database holdings of the Angus Reid Groups' *Reid Report*, the Gallup Organization's *Gallup Reports (Canada)*, and Decima Research's *Decima Quarterly* report, for the period 1985-1995. Questions were counted according to their featuring the following words or phrases: Asia, East Asia, Asia Pacific, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, ASEAN and/or APEC. Note that this was only a cursory review of a limited base of data, and should been seen as merely *suggestive*.

Third, while most respondents seemed to think that the Asia Pacific region was an important one for Canada, many of these indicated that they were not familiar with regional trends or issues. This is suggested, for example, by the results of a recent Goldfarb poll, presented in Tables 1.8 and 1.9. The former shows that 47% of respondents thought that APEC should be a "very high" or "fairly high" priority for Canada, but the latter shows that only 13% described themselves as "very familiar" or "somewhat familiar" with the organization. [43] Another indication of the public's lack of familiarity with Asia Pacific affairs is the relatively high number of "don't know" responses to relevant poll questions. As shown in Table 1.5, for example, only 11% of respondents did not feel sufficiently knowledgeable to offer an opinion on appropriate levels of trade with the United States, in comparison to the high number of "don't know" responses for China (25%), Korea (30%), and Indonesia (50%).

This latter observation coincides with the opinions of government officials and academics interviewed for this paper, who expressed the belief that the general public had a vague sense of the growing importance of Eastern Asia for Canada, but knew very little about the extent or nature of Canada's involvement in the region. There was a general sense among those interviewed, moreover, that the public's familiarity with specific issues and central controversies associated with Asia Pacific regional politics was significantly less extensive than that for some other regions, notably North America and Europe. But there was also uncertainty about exactly how much and what kinds of knowledge the general public has with respect to Asia Pacific affairs. What exactly is the current baseline for public awareness of Canada's Asia Pacific relations? How are government officials to measure the efficacy of efforts to stimulate public awareness and interest in the region?

In order to track public awareness of Canada's Asia Pacific relations, it is recommended that DFAIT develop a four-year strategy for the collection of data on public awareness and understanding of the region and Canada's involvement therein, to be implemented by one of Canada's national polling agencies. Focus groups, selected by quota to represent a broad cross-section of the public, should also be used to obtain public input on specific policy questions on an *ad hoc* basis and to test potential national survey questions. It is further recommended, based on the apparent lack of awareness among the general public at this time, that the primary focus of this strategy not be on measuring detailed knowledge or approval for specific policy options, but on

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43. This is reinforced by the fact that 28% of respondents said they did not know how to rank the priority to be placed on APEC, a far higher number than for most of the other international organizations featured in the question (refer to Table 1.9).

tracking familiarity with specific regional institutions and controversies over time, and on identifying preferred (general) objectives and priorities. This strategy, and all relevant resource allocations, should provide for the conduct of multivariate analyses, in order to make efficient use of data collected and gain a more nuanced understanding of divergences of awareness and preferences within the general public. [44] Particular attention should be paid to differences of opinion/preference between respondents describing themselves as more or less familiar with regional affairs and/or demonstrating greater or lesser knowledge of regional affairs through basic factual questions. Appendix Two of this report presents a series of model poll questions which could be useful (as a rough guide only) to the development this long-term polling strategy.

At the same time, government should continue and extend its efforts to actively promote public awareness of and interest in Asia Pacific affairs. First, it is recommended that the government supplement existing initiatives with an "interactive" Internet site for open dialogue with the Canadian public on Asia Pacific issues. DFAIT has already had some promising experience in this regard, through the posting on its Internet site of a small number of questions for discussion on selected foreign policy themes. The proposed Asia Pacific site would be administered by DFAIT and prominently linked with the DFAIT main site (essentially taking the place of the existing CYAP "page"), with additional links to relevant federal and provincial government sites, and to a small number of academic, business association, and NGO sites, selected according to the relevance of their content and the number and variety of further links provided. This DFAIT Asia Pacific site would feature brief updates on regional events, notification and explanation of current government policies, and opportunities for interested Canadians of all backgrounds to offer their views on Asia Pacific policy questions posed by high-profile government officials (i.e., Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for International Trade, Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific)). Sample responses to these policy questions, and answers to frequently asked questions on government policy or regional affairs could be posted periodically. This initiative would make possible an unprecedented level of "direct" contact and exchange between government officials and virtually all segments of Canadian society, both expert and non-expert, through a communications medium

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44. Each of the intra-government reports of poll analysis on Asia Pacific issues reviewed for this report featured univariate analysis of results and simplistic respondent profiles. A more extensive review of a small sample of government analyses of opinion surveys on Canada's participation in the Gulf War had similar findings. R.H. MacDermid, "Public Opinion Polling and Canadian Involvement in the Gulf War." Whether this should be traced to questionable methodology on the part of government analysts or a lack of interest in more complex findings on the part of higher-level officials is less important than the fact that the end-product is a weaker guide to policy-making and an inefficient use of the resources dedicated to data collection.

which is relatively inexpensive and equally suitable for the immediate exchange of information and longer-term dialogue.

Second, it is recommended that government continue to experiment with new approaches to integrating non-expert Canadians into foreign policy consultation. When the government sponsors or conducts *ad hoc* or regular multi-sectoral consultations, it should endeavour to include or set up parallel focus group meetings for non-experts wherever appropriate. Submissions by "ordinary Canadians" to various policy options development fora or series, including parliamentary review and the interactive Internet site proposed above, should also be encouraged. Additional remarks on the conduct of foreign policy consultative initiatives will be made in the Conclusions section, but attention should be drawn here to two aspects of these fora. Government efforts to achieve gender, ethnocultural, and regional balance in its "outreach" activities are commendable, but have thus far been inadequate, and should be extended wherever possible. [45] In a diverse country like Canada, it is natural to expect a clustering of interests and concerns within particular regions or provinces, or between urban and rural areas, with respect to various foreign policy issue areas. It is important, however, to ensure that there are opportunities to participate and gain sponsorship for relevant projects even within regions whose overall interest in Asia Pacific affairs may be relatively limited. Also, the emphasis in recent "outreach" initiatives on youth and the promotion of marketable skills and experience are entirely appropriate, and especially so for those focusing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations. [46] As the crisis of youth job creation continues, government should seize every opportunity to provide young adults with opportunities to gather experience and contacts that will serve them within Canada and in the wider regional market. Particular attention should be given in future to the creation or extension of exchanges, apprenticeships, and

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45. Though only a partial indicator as best, the list of respondents to the survey of selected "stakeholders" preceding CYAP is suggestive. With the understandable exception of very high numbers from Ottawa and Ontario, the regional distribution of participants was reasonably representative (with the Ottawa set removed, British Columbia 24%, Prairies 12%, Ontario 30%, Quebec 22%, Atlantic 8%). Gender ratios were less impressive (Female 24%, Male 76%). It is slightly more difficult to assess ethnocultural diversity from a written catalogue, but Eastern Asian surnames accounted for only about 15% of the total (where one might rather have expected an over-representative sample). As mentioned in a later section, representation from "civil society" and labour organizations in the study was virtually nil (about 2%). Le Groupe Columbia Communications, Inc. "Final Report: A Year of Asia Pacific in Canada in 1997" (unpublished report prepared for DFAIT, August 1996). See also: Sandra Whitworth, "Women, and Gender, in the Foreign Policy Review Process" (pp. 83-98), in M.A. Cameron & M.Appel Molot (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1995*.

46. The most prominent aspect of this in the Asia Pacific context is the CYAP-affiliated youth conference-"Asia Connects/Cherchons l'Asie"—scheduled to take place in Winnipeg later this summer. Refer to the release on the DFAIT Internet site: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/-cyap-acap/english/forum1.htm.

cross-cultural (i.e., language) training. The emphasis on youth should also be carried over into the planning and conduct of future opinion survey and focus group research with Asia Pacific themes.

As outlined in the Introduction, government efforts to stimulate awareness and engagement on Asia Pacific affairs in the short term should be supported and aligned with longer-term efforts that focus on the everyday roots of misperception and apathy. One important part of the explanation for the general lack of familiarity with Asia Pacific affairs within Canada is the relative lack of attention to Eastern Asia within school curricula at the primary, secondary, and university levels. Despite pressures over the last twenty years for new attention to the history and culture of other regions, textbooks and instruction in Canadian classrooms remain predominantly focused on Europe and North America. This may have been partially remedied over the last fifteen years: at the primary school level by government-sponsored multicultural programs; at the secondary school level by the higher educational background of teachers; and at the university undergraduate level by the diversification of faculty specializations, an increase in the number of grant agencies and programs with an international focus, and the growth of specialized international or area studies research units. [47] Further research is clearly in order on the long-term evolution of classroom curricula in Canada and its impacts on the international outlook of Canadian students.

One of the principal causes of inertia with respect to the diversification of school curricula, at all levels, is the increasing pressure on faculty preparation time caused by funding cutbacks to education, which pushes instructors to rely on existing curricula, even where it is known to be outdated or even politically biased. Through creative coordination among existing research organizations, the federal government, in partnership with the provinces, could take aggressive strides toward remedying this shortfall of curriculum-development support, at very limited cost. With government support, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC) maintains computer databases listing primary and secondary school educators in Canada with an interest in Asia Pacific issues, and of the materials and methods they have developed in this regard. The APFC is also compiling a modest database of research on Asia Pacific issues for use in curriculum development at the K-12 and college levels. Each of these databases are currently available to educators across Canada, but the APFC is obligated by limited funding to charge an access fee

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47. On the latter, see also: David B. Dewitt & Brian L. Job, "Asia Pacific Security Studies in Canada" (pp. 69-106), in Paul M. Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities* (Toronto: JCAPS/CSIS, 1994).

which may be prohibitive for many potential users. [48] It is recommended that the federal government, in cooperation with the provinces, maintain funding for this project in order to minimize the cost of access to the database, and set aside additional funding for the preparation, advertisement, and distribution (at *nominal* charge) of a small package of curriculum development materials for secondary school instructors. This package could take the form of a series of booklets, of no more than 30 pages each, to be produced under the supervision of DFAIT and the office of the Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific), by a small temporary committee of experts on regional affairs, to be drawn from the APFC, the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) and the Asia Pacific Research Information Network (APECRIN). [49] The booklets would provide concise topical information and selected research references—oriented to secondary school students—on Asia Pacific history and politics, geography and the environment, business, culture and communications, with specific attention to contemporary Canadian concerns. This initiative should be seen as a pilot project, which could be reproduced for other regions with which Canada's ties are deepening (i.e., Latin America, South Asia).

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48. This information is stored separately in three different databases—the Directory of Canadian Educators Database, the Course Outlines Database, and the Curriculum Development Database.

49. Further information and further recommendations concerning the APFC, CANCAPS and APECRIN are presented in Sections Four, Five and Six, and in Appendix Four, of this paper.

FOUR
CANADIAN NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Another important basis for the apparent lack of awareness of and interest in Asia Pacific affairs among the general public in Canada is the inadequacy of Canadian news media coverage of the region. In 1992, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada published a study, conducted by Marc Beliveau and Georges Payastre, of coverage of Asia Pacific events and issues by major Canadian newspapers and radio and television stations in 1988. [50] Among the study's major conclusions, were : a) though the amount of "Asia-related material" in Canadian news media had increased significantly over the previous ten years, it still amounted to only five percent of the total coverage of international affairs surveyed; and b) Canadian coverage of Asia was primarily focused on "picture stories," like riots and natural disasters, and did not include much attention to complex political or economic issues like multilateral institution-building or trade negotiation.

Government, academic, business, and NGO experts interviewed during the preparation of this paper agreed that, though Canadian news coverage of the region remained inadequate and significantly inferior to that of North America and Europe, there were indications that it *had* become significantly more extensive and marginally more sophisticated over the last five to ten years. Among the noted areas of improvement are attention to regional organization and summitry, familiarity with regional leaders, coverage of the domestic politics in Eastern Asian states and other regional developments with no direct "Canadian angle," and general complexity of understanding of regional dynamics and practices. There are a number of plausible explanations for the gradual improvement of Canadian coverage of Asia Pacific affairs, including increasing familiarity with Eastern Asian political personalities through summit diplomacy, the formation of new multilateral institutions (ARF, APEC) as media focal points, and the exacerbation of trans-Pacific tensions with respect to human rights.

On another level, this marginal improvement of "Canadian" coverage might also be explained by citing a general improvement of coverage by large foreign—primarily American—news service agencies. In their 1992 study, Beliveau and Payastre explained that Canadian news media organizations, facing tightening national competition, could not afford to sustain an active

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50. Marc Beliveau & Georges Payastre, *Canadian Media's Perceptions of Asia / Asian Media's Perceptions of Canada* (Vancouver: APFC, 1992). This study, though excellent, is now almost ten years out of date. A follow-up study is therefore to be encouraged, in order to evaluate the widespread perception that the improvement of media coverage of Asia has accelerated over the last five to ten years.

presence within Eastern Asia, and were increasingly obligated to rely on foreign sources (mostly U.S.-based news wire services) for coverage of Asia Pacific events. In fact, they found that over 60 percent of surveyed Canadian news coverage of Asia during 1988 was drawn from foreign sources.[51] Competitive pressure has driven many Canadian news media organizations to develop creative new arrangements in order to sustain or extend their presence within the region, including increasing reliance on a small group of Canadian free-lance journalists and new cost-sharing arrangements with news media organizations from other relatively small or marginal Asia Pacific states. Moreover, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has developed a financial award program designed to enable Canadian journalists to undertake short-term reporting assignment(s) in Japan, Korea or Taiwan, or Southeast Asia.

In spite of these gradual improvements, Canadian business executives with connections to Eastern Asia have made it clear that they find the extent and the content of Canadian coverage of Asia Pacific events and trends inadequate, and have consistently chosen to make use of foreign news and analysis. Canadian academic specialists and NGO researchers have also been primarily reliant on foreign sources both for coverage of current events and analysis. While our engagement in the region clearly will not grind to halt without extensive Canadian "in-house" coverage of Asia Pacific affairs, the development and continuation of independent Canadian media coverage is important in at least three ways.

First, the sometimes belittled "Canadian angle" on international news plays an important role in shaping popular ideas about Canada's place in the world. The virtual absence of a distinctly Canadian viewpoint in mainstream news coverage of Eastern Asian affairs seriously undermines efforts to reinforce Canadians' perceptions of themselves and their country as part of an emergent Asia Pacific community.

Second, in the long run, reliance on foreign news service sources would seem to entail a lack of attention to diplomatic and economic issues of special relevance or concern to Canada, including (for example): peace-keeping and "peace-building"; institutionalization and multilateralization of trade agreements; specific commercial sectors like agri-food and forest products; various aspects of state and regional stability, including threats to Canadians and Canadian investments abroad, migration, and environmental change.

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51. M. Beliveau & G. Payastre, *Canadian Media's Perceptions of Asia*, p. 11.

Third, several of the regional experts interviewed for this report cited news media coverage as a key indicator of public interest and awareness, and—for some—the general tilt of public opinion.[52] Since reliance on foreign sources may ultimately mean that some issues or events of interest to Canadians are not adequately covered, experts (including government officials) may be getting a skewed picture of the basis for public interest and involvement in Asia Pacific policy questions. Some of those interviewed suggested that there is a perception among Canadian news editors that most aspects of Asia Pacific regional politics are not very "newsworthy," in the sense that they will not attract the attention of a general audience. Indeed, some important aspects of the evolving regional order are not amenable to capturing the attention of relatively disinterested observers, particularly in contrast to parallel developments within Europe: while regional politics in Europe are often legalistically confrontational, regional affairs in the Asia Pacific are based on quiet accommodation; while European regional fora have deep historical and institutional roots, those in the Asia Pacific (i.e., APEC, ASEAN) have an "intangible" quality that is reinforced by a determination not to make controversial decisions and an apparent functional subordination to bilateral diplomacy. Nevertheless, carefully-aimed government intervention can provide for new levels of both market supply and public demand for news on Eastern Asia, and an effective government-sponsored "jump-start" should lead to mutually-reinforcing increases on both sides of the equation. While the federal government is not, nor should be, in the business of telling news media firms what is "newsworthy," it clearly has both the incentives and the means to provide them with timely and well-packaged information about Canadian government decisions and concerns, and developments within relevant regional diplomatic fora and trade negotiations.

And, while it is not appropriate for government to directly subsidize news media coverage of particular places or issues, it is entirely appropriate for government to encourage and assist Canadian media firms in establishing cost-sharing partnerships with counterparts from countries whose presence in Eastern Asia is also small but growing (i.e., Australian or Western European firms), and to provide the kind of regional market-entry support given to other Canadian service enterprises (i.e., consular and trade commission services). It is also recommended that the government maintain its financial support for the APFC's media assignment award program, and provide resources and support for occasional workshops for Canadian journalists covering Eastern Asia, with an eye to encouraging the growth of an informal national network of editors and

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52. Note that this coincides with the results of a survey of U.S. foreign policy officials, most of whom cited news media coverage among their most important bases for gauging the interest and opinion of the general public in specific foreign policy issues. Philip Powlick, "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials" *International Studies Quarterly* 39:4 (December 1995): 427-451, pp. 434-435.

reporters, and the extension of links between this network and experts from the academic, business and NGO communities. These links should also extend to media organizations providing service aimed at Canadians of Asian heritage, and government should experiment with new approaches to setting up an informal exchange of information and views on foreign policy issues between government officials and representatives of Asian Canadian news media organizations.

FIVE
NETWORKS OF EXPERTS

Historically, the Canadian government has been relatively reluctant to "open" the foreign policy-making process to non-government experts, including academic specialists. Academic input has generally been limited to short-term, narrowly policy-oriented reports commissioned by major government agencies (DFAIT, DND, CIDA), or presentations to departmental or parliamentary committees. This contrasts with the foreign policy-making process in many Eastern Asian states over the last ten years, wherein small numbers of highly-trained experts have moved back and forth between academic and government careers, academics and government officials participate in international fora as a cohesive unit, and academic input is directly incorporated in virtually all levels of foreign policy decision-making. [53] Recently, however, closer working relationships have been established between certain government departments/agencies and university scholars on Asia Pacific policy matters, particularly in the areas of regional economic coordination and security cooperation. [54] One element of this closer cooperation has been government support for participation by Canadian academics in regional "track two" diplomacy, which features regular dialogue and information-sharing among non-government experts (and, in some cases, government officials attending in an unofficial capacity) from various countries in the region. [55] Others elements include *ad hoc* small-group consultations on regional crises and specific policy problems, and increased government participation in academic-centred policy research organizations like CANCAPS.

Canadian government officials interviewed for this report reported that they saw input from academic specialists and other experts as a valuable asset to decision-making, but not necessarily a reflection of concerns among the general public. [56] While it is appropriate to see academics as

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53. D.B. Dewitt & B.L. Job, "Asia Pacific Security Studies in Canada," pp. 77-81. Refer also to the other chapters in P.M. Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security*.

54. Lawrence T. Woods, "The Asia Pacific Policy Network in Canada" *The Pacific Review* 7:4 (1994): 435-445.

55. D.B. Dewitt & B.L. Job, "Asia Pacific Security Studies in Canada" pp. 77-91. Paul M. Evans, "Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)" *The Pacific Review* 7:2 (1994): 125-139.

56. It is worth noting that the study by Philip Powlick of U.S. foreign policy officials, outlined in Section One, contains sections on the inputs of "elites" and on "interest groups," but does not discuss inputs from academic specialists specifically. Refer to: P. Powlick, "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials" pp. 433-446. There have been a small number of studies in Canada of the roles played by academics in specific policy networks, but not in the foreign policy-making process as a whole.

separate from the general public, with their own collective interests and concerns, it is also important to see that they can and should be an integral part of an enhanced participatory foreign policy process. It is also worth noting that the potential contributions of academic experts to participatory policy-making go beyond their direct inputs of knowledge and insight. Academic experts can play important roles in promoting engagement between government and other non-government sectors through their research contributions to news media analysis, parliamentary investigations, or preparatory materials for multi-sectoral consultations, and through the facilitation of open conferences and workshops.

The growth of Canadian expertise on Asia Pacific affairs has accelerated over the last ten years, [57] but there are still only a relatively small number of very well-trained Canadian experts with extensive knowledge of Eastern Asian language and culture, politics, and diplomacy. This number may be understood as low in relative terms, in comparison with the number of experts on North American or European society and politics, or in absolute terms, with reference to a possible shortfall over the next few years of experienced and capable Canadian representatives for the rapidly-growing number of regional "track-two" dialogue activities. It is recommended that government recognize the need for encouraging and cultivating a new cohort of Canadian Asia Pacific specialists, in government and in academia, as a prerequisite for successful long-term engagement in the region, whether it be directly, through official or "track two" diplomacy, or indirectly, through the spread of interest and awareness of Asia Pacific issues within the general public. Among many possible components of a larger strategy for the cultivation of a self-renewing community of Asia Pacific experts in Canada might be support for one or more new scholarly journals featuring Canadian perspectives on Asia Pacific affairs, to complement *Pacific Affairs*.

As Canadian Asia Pacific expertise has grown, there has been a proliferation of academic and other non-government collaborative networks for engagement with government and the public. These networks have coalesced around the same four basic sets of issues identified in the introduction: cultural, political/humanitarian, economic, and security. The first of these is not taken up directly

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57. This growth of Canadian expertise over the last few years has been accompanied by a diffusion of the pool of expertise into the business sector, and, especially very recently, the NGO community. Though the remainder of this section concentrates on academic expertise, it should be noted that the division between these three categories has become increasingly blurry over the last twenty years, as some experts pursue complex career paths joining involvement in academia, business and/or NGO activity. Also, in the Asia Pacific sphere as elsewhere, there are also a number of government-sponsored non-profit organizations which focus on service to the business community (e.g., APFC) and a small number of academic research groups which attend to the needs of the NGO community (e.g., the APEC Research Information Network).

in this project, the second and third are addressed in later sections, and the fourth will be discussed briefly here.

Perhaps the simplest and most concise way to outline the actual and potential roles for academic specialists in an effective participatory policy-making process for Canada's Asia Pacific relations is to begin by describing the rough division of labour between two recently-established academic-driven organizations, CMC/CSCAP and CANCAPS. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is one of more than two dozen new channels for unofficial "track two" dialogue on security issues in the region, expected to attract a growing share of Canadian unofficial expert activity and government support, because of the special opportunities it affords for high-profile, effective Canadian participation. [58] CMC/CSCAP is the Canadian Member Committee for CSCAP, a small group of senior academic specialists, business executives, journalists, and government officials acting in an unofficial capacity, which coordinates Canadian participation in the CSCAP process and maintains an exchange of views and information with government departments and other interested experts. [59] CANCAPS, the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, is a rapidly-growing network of academic specialists on Asia Pacific security affairs, with support and participation from government and some representation from the NGO community. CANCAPS does not participate directly in regional "track two" activities, but rather focuses on facilitating research collaboration within Canada and on the growth of a broad network of specialists on regional security affairs. [60] This division of labour is very much by design, since the core membership of both organizations is a small group of academic specialists, who have established and managed both through the same base of grant funding.

Because of the high levels of experience and close coordination required by the process, it is entirely appropriate for CMC/CSCAP to continue in its present form, as a small group of senior non-government experts, whose primary focus is on regional "track two" activities. Its challenges will increasingly involve technical support and advisory relations with government, coordination of Canadian participation in various regional security dialogue processes, and coordination with

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58. Paul M. Evans, "The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis" (pp. 297-316), in P. M. Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security*. For a more extensive discussion of CSCAP, see: P.M. Evans, "Building Security."

59. P.M. Evans, "Building Security." n.a., "CSCAP Finds Its Stride" and Brian Job, "CMC/CSCAP Meeting" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 12 (February 1997): 13-14.

60. n.a., "Asia Pacific Security Consortium Formed" and n.a., "Why CANCAPS?" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 1 (January 1994): 1-2. See also subsequent issues of *CANCAPS Bulletin*.

similar groups in other areas (i.e. PECC). [61] CANCAPS, on the other hand—as a research network linking government and non-government specialists, whose purposes include the promotion of "public awareness and exchange activities"—has the potential to play a number of important roles in promoting participatory policy-making within Canada. One of these roles should be as an informal "accountability" mechanism for CMC/CSCAP, collecting and distributing information and viewpoints on CSCAP activities and controversies and on Canadian contributions to the process. More importantly, CANCAPS' broad conception of "security" and the growing diversity of its expert participants, make it well-suited to the establishment of network relations with other sectors, and broad-based discussion of issues previously considered separately in the social or economic spheres.

As outlined in Section Three, CANCAPS could be invited to form a small temporary working group, made up of junior and senior scholars, to coordinate with organizations like the APFC, in order to develop new materials for curriculum development at the high school and university undergraduate levels. As outlined in Section Four, CANCAPS experts could be encouraged to establish network contacts with journalists interested in Asia Pacific affairs. And, as outlined in Section Six, APFC-CANCAPS research collaboration on "political risk" and challenges for business in the Asia Pacific region could be extended to new research on "political risk" and its relation to business opportunities within specific countries.

Government-sponsored multi-sectoral consultative fora on Canada's Asia Pacific relations should include close attention to regional security issues, including peace-keeping, conflict resolution, and arms non-proliferation. Noting that most CANCAPS members also have expertise in other aspects of Canada's Asia Pacific relations and of Canadian foreign policy more generally, they should be encouraged not only to participate in such fora, but also to take an active role in planning and implementation, including the selection of themes for discussion and the development of preparatory materials. It is also recommended that CANCAPS be encouraged to actively recruit appropriate NGO representatives for membership, in order to broaden its range of viewpoints and facilitate the expansion of the policy network. [62] The transition to a more diverse membership

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61. It may eventually be desirable for CSCAP and PECC to be folded into a single "track two" process—a development that would have important consequences for the Canadian member committees for each process—but it seems appropriate at this time to maintain two independent vehicles for dialogue on security and economic issues. See: P.M. Evans, "Building Security," pp. 131-132. L.T. Woods, "The Asia Pacific Policy Network," p. 442.

62. Such a move would also open up new opportunities for collaborative fund-raising and cost-sharing on joint activities (i.e. conferences, workshops).

would undoubtedly be made smoother if conference discussion topics (and possibly also working group subjects) were to feature subjects of mutual interest, such as regime security and intrastate conflict, human rights, and the domestic consequences of regional integration.

Each of these new purposes and initiatives must be set up carefully, so that they do not detract from CANCAPS' effectiveness as a network for collaborative academic research and a pool of expertise for regional "track two" activities. Current levels of government support—in terms of both funding and participation—will need to be maintained in order to continue existing activities. If the Consortium is to take on new responsibilities, such as those proposed above, then new funding and support from relevant government agencies will be required, but so will new levels of creativity in securing funding from untapped non-government sources, including foundations and the business community. [63]

63. CMC/CSCAP and CANCAPS recently received substantial new financial support from the Max Bell Foundation, but will require additional funding over the next few years in order to cover an expanding membership and increased activity. Brian Job, "CANCAPS and Canada's Year of Asia Pacific" and n.a., "CANCAPS Business—New Board, Fees Raised" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 12 (February 1997), pp. 1-2.

SIX
CANADIAN BUSINESS AND CANADA'S ASIA PACIFIC RELATIONS

The Chretien government, like the Mulroney government before it, has been a determined advocate of multilateral liberalization of international trade and investment, and has pursued extended commercial and diplomatic links with the countries of Latin America and the Asia Pacific. But the Chretien government has invested a much larger share of its diplomatic energies into these "new" regional relationships, and, in contrast to its predecessor, has framed them in terms of a need to offset ever-deepening economic ties with the United States. [64] In the case of the Asia Pacific in particular, this shift has also been driven by growing recognition of the economic opportunities afforded to Canada by the region's combination of high growth rates, rapidly-growing consumer market and underdeveloped infrastructure. The Canadian business community has also recognized the growing importance of Eastern Asia, both as a site for trade and investment and as a source of competition. A vigourous business lobby has therefore formed within Canada, with a focus on maintaining government attention and influencing policy on trans-Pacific trade and investment issues. [65] A small number of large Canadian firms are already deeply involved in trade with Eastern Asia, or have made cautious first steps into the region, and have been supportive of the Chretien government's energetic promotion of Canadian ventures, particularly the "Team Canada" bilateral trade initiatives. Many others, however, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have been reluctant to take up the challenge, seeing the possible rewards of new trade with Asia as outweighed by the perceived risks and obstacles. [66] And there has been only reserved support from Canadian firms of all sizes for the government's involvement in APEC, the primary post-Cold War vehicle for regional dialogue on economic policy coordination in the Asia Pacific.

Engagement between government and business on Asia Pacific affairs in Canada has been conducted almost entirely through direct contact between corporate executives or business

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64. Frank Langdon, "Canada's Goal in the Asia Pacific" *The Pacific Review* 8:2 (1995): 383-400.

65. Lawrence T. Woods, *Canada's Pacific Business Lobby* (Working Paper #42)(Toronto: Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1986).

66. A.E. Safarian & Wendy Dobson (eds.), *Benchmarking the Canadian Business Presence in East Asia* (Hong Kong Bank of Canada Papers on Asia, vol. 1) (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for International Business, 1995).

association representatives and high level officials in the executive or relevant departments. [67] Since the 1950s, however, there has been a gradually-accelerating accumulation of non-government organizations and business associations acting as advisory councils or otherwise mediating between business and government on Asia Pacific economic issues. [68] Over the last few years, as APEC has become a central fixture of Canada's Asia Pacific policies, a complex and evolving division of labour among the larger and more influential of these lobby and policy network organizations has taken shape. The APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), which replaced the APEC Eminent Persons Group last year, is an official regional forum made up of national committees of appointees, for the exchange of views and information, designed to generate policy-relevant insights on issues relevant to APEC. The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), is an unofficial grouping of national committees, made up of business executives and academics, which operates as a "track two" dialogue process. The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) is an older and much larger unofficial body of business executives favouring regional trade liberalization, which is expected by many to be gradually subordinated to ABAC. Canadian participation in all three of these broad regional organizations has been limited, and—in the case of PBEC and PECC—may be slowly declining. [69] Both PECC and PBEC are challenged by a gradual diversion of government money and attention to APEC and ABAC, and by increased interest among firms of all sizes in business councils or associations that focus on specific bilateral relationships and/or market sectors. [70]

Though engagement between business and government has become increasingly "open"—in the sense that it is now more often conducted in multilateral settings and/or through large umbrella associations, and more frequently reflects concern with broader policy questions—it remains isolated from policy debate among other segments of Canadian society. Despite government promotion and encouragement over the last few years, corporations and business associations

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67. L.T. Woods, "The Business of Canada's Pacific Relations." Refer also to the general discussion of the role(s) of the business community in foreign policy-making since World War Two in: D.B. Dewitt & J.J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, pp. 181-186.

68. L.T. Woods, *Canada's Pacific Business Lobby*. H. Edward English, "Canada and the United States Look West: Pacific Policy Networks" (169-188), in Brian W. Tomlin & Maureen Appel Molot (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1986: Talking Trade* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1987).

69. Refer to the discussion in: APFC, *Canada Asia Review 1997*, pp. 20-28. L.T. Woods, "The Asia Pacific Policy Network."

70. Among the larger and more influential of these councils and associations are the ASEAN Canada Business Council, the Canada China Business Council, the Canada Japan Trade Council, and the Canada Korea Business Council.

have been reluctant to participate in or pay for research or consultative initiatives which are not likely to generate clear-cut, immediate returns, in terms of advance information on government policy or market intelligence. [71]

There has been some receptiveness on the part of Canadian businesses to certain kinds of research, training, networking, and facilitation services provided by government and non-profit agencies, including "cross-cultural" training and research on domestic political stability. Yet there is still uncertainty in government about what the business community expects of foreign policy departments and agencies, and about what it might have to contribute to the wider foreign policy-making process. It is therefore recommended that government supplement the four-year strategy for opinion polling research proposed in Section Three with a broadly-distributed "write-in" survey of Canadian business executives, focusing on identifying specific concerns regarding direct trade and investment in Eastern Asia, expectations for government trade commission and regional consular services, perceived utility of non-government research and outreach agencies like the APFC, and attitudes toward various forms of engagement with government on policy issues.

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC) was created by act of Parliament in 1984, as a government-sponsored independent organization to conduct research and "outreach" activities designed to increase awareness and understanding of Eastern Asia among Canadians, and awareness and understanding of Canada within Eastern Asia. [72] However, the Foundation has not enjoyed stable financial or political support from subsequent governments, and has consequently "limped along" over the last ten years. [73] Recently, it has adapted to steadily-deepening funding cuts by concentrating on servicing the penetration of Eastern Asian markets by Canadian business. [74] Among the services now provided by the APFC are marketing support for Canadian universities in Eastern Asian countries, language and "cross-cultural" training, seminars and networking for environmental business firms, a news media assignment award program (refer to Section Four), and various research and technical services conducted through its Research and Analysis Division. Though some of these programs have been quite successful, the organization has had difficulty in generating an adequate financial base through proprietary services, and continues to suffer a

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71. This observation was offered in each of two separate interviews, one with a DFAIT official and the other with a representative of the APFC.

72. APFC, *Canada Asia Review 1997*, pp. 87-92. Refer also to: John Bruk, *Asia Pacific Foundation: A Study Prepared for the Secretary of State for External Affairs* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1982).

73. F. Langdon, "Canada's Goal in the Asia Pacific," p. 391.

74. F. Langdon, "Canada's Goal in the Asia Pacific," p. 395.

kind of slow financial asphyxiation. This should be a matter of immediate concern for Canadian foreign policy-makers, because (among other reasons) the APFC stands out as an ideal vehicle for coordinating participatory initiatives on Asia Pacific issues. [75] More specifically, it remains, despite the apparent erosion of its credibility in the eyes of government and business over the last few years, the best available means for bringing business with an interest in Eastern Asia into sustained "open" engagement on a broad array of issues. It is therefore recommended that government support for the APFC be stabilized, and that it be encouraged to find its way back to its original mandate of engagement with all sectors of Canadian society. Like other similar organizations, the Foundation should of course be expected to continue to exercise creativity in obtaining non-government financial support for its activities.

Of special importance for the purposes of this report, there are a number of services which the APFC can provide the business community that could not only be expected to recuperate costs but also to catalyse the incremental engagement of business with government and other non-government sectors on a broader array of Asia Pacific issues. Among these is the production and distribution of research on "political risk" and the challenges it poses for trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region. Canadian business has increasingly come to recognize the importance, in conducting trade and investment in Eastern Asia, of familiarity not only with the nature and dynamics of local markets, but also of the peculiarities and perils of local politics, and, in some cases, of regional security dynamics. This growing recognition of the complex linkages between markets and "political risk," which is in turn linked with civil-military relations, ethnic relations, human rights, and environmental degradation, represents an important point of intersection between the immediate concerns of business, government, academics, and NGOs in Canada. (Note that it also coincides with the broad conception of "security" now widely accepted among academic specialists, regional diplomats, and—increasingly—business and NGO representatives.)

The APFC, in cooperation with organizations like CANCAPS, is well placed to draw the business community into a dialogue on these issues, and from there to open the way to a sustained exchange on a broader array of issues. Since private-sector clients have shown an interest in research bearing on specific bilateral contexts, the APFC—with help from academic experts—could follow up its research on "political risk" in the regional context by expanding the coverage of its popular "Country Backgrounder" series to include greater attention to questions of domestic

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75. Indeed, the APFC is already playing important roles in the organization and implementation of CYAP, including support for the collection of input from "stakeholders" in the early planning of the initiative, and the organization of a youth conference in Winnipeg ("Asia Connects").

stability and civil conflict *in specific Eastern Asian countries*. It could organize and distribute research on the present and potential social effects—both positive and negative—of new patterns of trade and investment on various Asia Pacific societies. And it could organize a series of focused workshops for business executives and government officials, organized according to specific sub-regions or market sectors, to exchange views on identifying and managing "political risk" in Eastern Asia, and to discuss related embassy and trade mission services. Over time, these incremental steps toward engagement, aimed at some of the immediate concerns of business and drawing primarily on business participation, could be gradually folded into larger and/or broader formats.

For government, the key to bringing business to the multi-sectoral table—though easier said than done—is to work gradually, beginning with subjects of clear and immediate concern, rather than handing business something it does not recognize and expecting it to respond. Once the initial engagement has been consolidated, other sectors must be brought in incrementally, starting from areas of intersecting interest and relatively marginal disagreement. This might seem to contradict comments made in Section One of this report, to the effect that participatory policy-making naturally includes confrontation and hard choices by government, but those remarks referred to the kind of relatively *mature* process that is expected to evolve through this incremental engagement strategy.

SEVEN
"CIVIL SOCIETY" ORGANIZATIONS, LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS

Attention to Asia Pacific issues by "civil society" and labour organizations in Canada has recently taken off, growing from a very low level at the beginning of the decade to dozens of new working groups or committees of all shapes and sizes. [76] The reasons for this accelerated growth are varied, but they include: a) the general rise in Eastern Asia's status as an important site of diplomatic and economic activity; b) the creation of relatively tangible regional institutional entities—ASEAN and APEC—and recognition of these as foci for NGO activity; c) the increasingly polarized trans-Pacific diplomatic confrontation on human rights; and d) the rise of indigenous NGOs within Eastern Asian states. Despite this rapid growth, the number and "size" of Canadian NGOs focused on the Asia Pacific remains small, both in comparison to the intensity of transnational interactions between Canada and Eastern Asia, and to the extent of Canadian NGO activity bearing on other regions (i.e., Africa, Latin America). There are still no relatively large NGOs or labour organizations in Canada with a specific focus on Asia Pacific issues.

There are however a number of small organizations focusing on particular aspects of Asia Pacific regional politics, most of these concentrating on human rights and sovereignty issues within a particular national or sub-regional context (i.e., East Timor, Tibet). A number of Eastern Asian immigrant community associations in Canada have become increasingly active on human rights and development issues in the Asia Pacific context, and some of have adopted many of the organizational and operational practices of conventional non-government organizations, but their engagement with government and the rest of Canadian society thus far has tended to be episodic and relatively low-key. [77] Several of the largest national and international NGOs in Canada—including the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development—have recently created or expanded working groups focusing on issues in the Asia Pacific context. This

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76. While organizations like the APFC and CANCAPS, and perhaps even the bilateral business advisory councils, could be considered non-government organizations, the phrase is used here to refer narrowly to non-profit organizations whose focus is on issues like peace, justice, equity, the empowerment of minority groups, and environmental sustainability.

77. The confrontation between the government of China and Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989 stirred the *ad hoc* creation of several Chinese Canadian pro-democracy advocacy groups, which joined with established organizations like the Chinese Canadian National Council to engage with government on Canadian policy. Some of these *ad hoc* groups still exist in some form, but now have little or no direct contact with DFAIT and other government agencies. Refer to: Kim Richard Nossal, *Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), ch. 8.

is also true of some of the larger labour organizations in Canada, including the Canadian Labour Congress. Finally, Canadian NGOs with an interest in Asia Pacific affairs have begun to effectively coordinate their activities, in their interaction with government and in their use of media for public education. One aspect of this last development is the blurring of the line between NGO and academic realms, as some individuals participate interchangeably within both, and as academic research groups like the APEC Research and Information Network (APECRIN) are created to service the research and networking needs of the NGO community. [78]

As NGO interest and activity around Asia Pacific issues has grown, so have expectations for a sustained and constructive engagement with government. The Chretien government's failure to meet these expectations, particularly in the context of its ardent courtship of the business community, has reaffirmed a perception among many NGO representatives that its Asia Pacific "strategy" is nothing more than a two-dimensional pursuit of market access, with little concern for the possible social and environmental impacts on Eastern Asia and on Canada. [79] Thus far, the Canada's Year of Asia Pacific initiative has served only to reinforce that perception, since its agenda was designed with virtually no input from NGOs, [80] and currently features few events of direct concern to the NGO community. (Appendix Three outlines a basic break-down of CYAP events, as of April 15 1997). Government officials have made efforts, particularly in the last few months, to make contact with and provide funding to Canadian NGOs interested in Asia Pacific affairs, but these efforts have often been diplomatically clumsy, and have tended to reinforce the impression that the government's interest is limited to surveillance and co-optation. [81] Many NGOs have therefore moved to closer coordination with other like-minded organizations, and to participation in "parallel" fora and events that exclude government and—in some cases—are increasingly detached from issues where NGO and government concerns intersect. This seems to be particularly true of the increasing NGO activity surrounding APEC and its upcoming annual

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78. APECRIN is a network of academic specialists based at the Institute for Asian Research at U.B.C., providing NGOs with information and analysis of government policy and regional developments associated with the APEC process. Additional information on APECRIN may be found in Appendix Five.

79. This theme came up a number of times in telephone interviews with NGO representatives and some academics.

80. A survey of over 300 selected "stakeholders," undertaken in 1996 by a consultancy group on behalf of DFAIT, to gather insights on the desirability and appropriate purposes of a "Year of Asia Pacific" in 1997, included inputs from representatives of less than a half-dozen "civil society" organizations and no labour organizations. Le Groupe Columbia Communications, "Final Report: A Year of Asia Pacific in Canada in 1997" (unpublished report, August 1996).

81. These reflections are based on remarks made by interviewed NGO representatives.

meeting in Vancouver (November 1997), which will be the focus of several "parallel" NGO fora or protest actions. [82]

There is a real danger that relations between Canadian NGOs and labour organizations on one hand, and government and the business community on the other, will become increasingly polarized, effectively erasing the existing space for constructive engagement. Careful work by government now could forestall such a polarization, by dispelling myths about the APEC process and cutting away its image as a secretive cartel, creating or enhancing "open" fora for consultation within Canada, and developing a long-term regional strategy that finds a sensible balance between the pursuit of trade and a firm commitment to jobs, human rights and the environment. Failure to establish an ongoing dialogue with "civil society" and labour organizations prior to the anticipated acceleration of the APEC process and/or new security commitments in the region, or to design future Asia Pacific policies according to intelligent compromises between contrary social and economic objectives, will invite the replication of the poisonous domestic confrontation that surrounded the negotiation of the FTA and NAFTA agreements.

However, contrary to the expectations of some of those on both sides of the current divide, mutually-rewarding engagement between government and NGOs will not be achieved easily or soon. In fact, efforts to achieve the participatory policy-making equivalent of "spontaneous combustion" by rubbing government, business, and NGO representatives together in a vacuum may be more likely to retard the process, by setting up unrealistic expectations for policy-relevant consensus and leading participants from each group to see the others as ill-informed or uncooperative. The establishment of a mature participatory process must be understood as an incremental process, a building of trust, and an exploration of common purposes and concerns, ultimately predicated on a shared willingness to compromise. Time and budget limitations, and the bureaucratic impulse to claim maximum short-term credit at minimum cost, will naturally drive government sponsors toward the staging of sterile and performative consultative events. And since NGOs, like some government departments, require a certain amount of routine public exposure, they will generally be ready to participate in "open" consultative fora, even when the foundation for an informed multi-sectoral discussion has clearly not been laid. Though these events serve a number of important purposes, including the attraction of media attention (and thereby that of the general public), the decision to stage any given consultative event should be

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82. Among the many NGO "parallel" events linked to the APEC meeting is the "1997 People's Summit on APEC," an open forum to take place in Vancouver in November, which has been organized by local and national labour, environmental, aboriginal, women's, religious and peace organizations.

weighed against the long-term value to be gained by using those resources to sponsor informal multi-sector network contacts, *ad hoc* issue-focused workshops, or the conduct and distribution of relevant policy research.

EIGHT
ENGAGING WITH ASIAN CANADIAN COMMUNITIES

Representatives of government agencies, research centres, business associations and NGOs interviewed for this study reported that their engagement with Asian Canadian community organizations had been limited and sporadic. Government and NGO representatives, moreover, expressed concern and some frustration with respect to the difficulties they have encountered in attempting to make and sustain contact with Asian Canadian communities. Reflections of this lack of mutual engagement appear in a variety of contexts, including: the relative scarcity of Asian Canadians in senior positions within the foreign policy bureaucracy and related policy research programs; [83] the tendency for Asian Canadian and non-Asian Canadian firms to gravitate to separate business associations; and the virtual absence of Asian Canadian community associations within "mainstream" NGO fora and activities associated with APEC/CYAP.

On the other hand, there have been some preliminary indications of new engagement in several areas, including *ad hoc* consultations between DFAIT officials and Chinese Canadian pro-democracy groups during the Tiannamen Square crisis, new levels of interaction between Asian Canadian and non-Asian Canadian firms through some of the larger bilateral business associations, and a gradual increase in the number of Asian Canadian graduate students involved in research on Asia Pacific relations. Nevertheless, there is widespread concern within the established policy community that Canada has not taken full advantage of the knowledge and experience of its Asian Canadian communities, in establishing trade and investment relationships, setting up cultural exchange, conducting regional diplomacy on human rights and security cooperation, and enhancing awareness of Asia Pacific issues within the wider general public. [84]

There is little point in trying to assign blame for the current lack of engagement. Instead, our focus should be on making the inclusion of Asian Canadians a central feature of a strategy for long-term government-public engagement on foreign policy issues. Though the development of a complete

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83. For example, CANCAPS' member directory for 1996 lists 65 high-level government Asia Pacific specialists (from DFAIT, DND, PCO, and CIDA). None of these are of Eastern Asian heritage. Note also that there are very few Asian Canadians within CANCAPS itself. Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, *Directory* (CANCAPS Directory #2)(October 1996). The APFC's Board of Governors is made up of 18 government, academic and private sector volunteers. Presently, only one is of Eastern Asian heritage. Refer to the listing in the APFC Internet site: http://www.apfnet.org/apfc/index.html#BOARD

84. As mentioned above, this concern was reflected in interviews with government officials and some NGO representatives. Refer also to: n.a., *Asian Canadians: Canada's Hidden Advantage* (Vancouver: APFC, 1994).

strategy of this kind would require an investment of time and resources far beyond that allotted for this project, a set of preliminary guidelines are provided here.

There has been little research on the participation of Canadians of Eastern Asian heritage in policy-making generally, and in foreign policy-making in particular. Efforts to bring this part of Canadian society into a participatory foreign policy process would be well-served by further study—through targeted survey research and comparative sociological studies—of Asian Canadian attitudes toward the role of the public in policy-making, appropriate foreign policy goals and priorities, and Canada's roles within the Asia Pacific region. Special interest in this regard should be paid to whether/how Asian Canadians' ideas about the appropriate relationships between government, business, and NGOs differ from those of other ethnocultural groups.

Common conceptions of political advocacy and community activism within Asian Canadian communities suggest marked differences from other ethnocultural groups, including a relative scarcity of formal advocacy organizations, a preference for informal mediation and compromise rather than judicial contestation, and a tendency to communal insularity. If this conception is genuinely reflective of the collective attributes of Asian Canadian communities, then it suggests a variety of challenges for government in establishing and maintaining an open dialogue with Asian Canadians on regional policy issues, and a need for significant adaptations of existing government "outreach" initiatives. For example, if Asian Canadians generally prefer to leave the resolution of collective concerns about regional developments to appropriate community leaders' informal contacts with regional elites and/or high level Canadian officials, then it will be exceptionally difficult for government to identify and keep track of representative groupings, in order to set up direct information exchange and extend direct invitations to consultative fora. In order to bring Asian Canadians into a broader participatory process, the government may have to give up its strict preference for controlled avenues of communication mediated through lists of "stakeholder" individuals or organizations (whether actually compiled as such or not), and experiment with a looser, voluntary-engagement process, mediated through broadly-publicized invitations for input, voluntary mailing lists and Internet list services, and a relatively "hands-off" approach to the organization of foreign policy fora that gives community organizers more latitude in choosing participants, subjects, formats and reporting methods.

There will nevertheless be a continuing need for government to be proactive in seeking out information on the concerns and activities of Asian Canadian communities, and—more generally—to make and maintain close contacts with well-connected individuals and organizations

"within" various Asian Canadian communities. Worth noting in this regard is the selection of a Chinese Canadian businessman and political activist, Raymond Chan, as the Chretien government's Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific. Among other assets Mr. Chan brings to this post, the appointment represents an important opportunity to establish deeper linkages between Cabinet, foreign policy-making departments, and the Chinese Canadian community (and possibly other Asian Canadian communities).

NINE
CONCLUSIONS—CYAP AND BEYOND

Reflections on CYAP

The designation of 1997 as Canada's Year of Asia Pacific, and the array of programs and events associated with the CYAP initiative, represent an important step toward raising awareness of Canada's Asia Pacific relations, both within Canada and in the countries of Eastern Asia. As a well-publicized series of events, with high-profile support from the Prime Minister and other senior officials, CYAP is well-suited to capture the attention of mainstream media and the general public.[85] (Appendix Three provides a breakdown of CYAP-affiliated events.[86]) The number of events related to APEC and/or focusing on the day-to-day concerns of business should attract strong participation from Canadian firms and associations interested in creating or extending commercial links in the region. And the impressive array of CYAP-affiliated cultural events will provide many opportunities for Canadians to discover (or re-discover) a colourful part of their country's multicultural mosaic, and for diplomats and business executives from both sides of the Pacific to develop the close personal relationships that are so essential to successful ties in the Asia Pacific region. However, CYAP does have a number of limitations—some inherent in the nature of the initiative, some not—that must be compensated for through supplemental initiatives and longer-term public engagement strategies.

First, CYAP was deliberately set up to focus on the promotion of regional trade and investment opportunities and on cultural relations, with only residual or incidental attention to issues like human rights, sustainable development and regional security cooperation. While it is understandable—and in some respects entirely appropriate—that government concentrate its energies in key areas, this concentration might lead the Canadian public, and perhaps some Eastern Asian observers as well, to think of these as the *only* bases for Canada's involvement in the region. Some of those interviewed for this project suggested that there is a perception, within some parts of the attentive public in Canada and among some influential elites in Eastern Asia, that the Canadian government has a "two-dimensional" understanding of the region, seeing and presenting it as only a free-floating basket of commercial opportunities. If this is so, then this perception will undoubtedly be reinforced by CYAP's narrow focus on trade and cultural ties. In

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85. This publicity is also a basis for attracting private sector sponsorship and reducing costs.

86. This break-down is based on the CYAP "Schedule of Events" listing on the DFAIT Internet site, as of April 15 1997. Further information on the source and organization of the breakdown is provided in Appendix Three.

order to achieve and sustain credibility with both the business and NGO sectors, future public fora and events on Canada's Asia Pacific relations must integrate the push for new commercial ties in the region with sober consideration of the limitations, uncertainties, and consequences of APEC and the push for regional integration and economic liberalization.

Second, CYAP is a single event, apparently without a planned follow-up, expected by many to be like a bright flash followed by lingering darkness. It may therefore reasonably be seen as at least somewhat counter-productive, since Canada's credibility as a partner in Asia Pacific regional cooperation ultimately depends on going beyond occasional fits of well-meaning hyperactivity to designing and implementing a thoughtful strategy for long-term regional engagement. [87] Such a strategy will entail difficult choices between policy options within the regional context, but also in the domestic context, between contending foreign policy priorities. Ultimately, the success of any strategy for regional engagement will depend on investments of government money and attention in programs whose benefits will be long-term, diffuse, and hard to measure, and therefore remote from political expediency. Support for these programs may be *more* difficult to secure in the wake of CYAP, since many government departments, foundations, firms and large NGOs will undoubtedly experience a kind of "Asia Pacific fatigue," as they find themselves pressed by constituents to turn their attention and resources to other areas. As one academic interviewee noted, this is the unfortunate irony of Canada's Year of Asia Pacific: that an event designed in part to enhance Canada's credibility and capabilities as a committed member of the Asia Pacific community might in fact lead to a lengthy period of inertia that could seriously undermine both.

Based partly on this concern, the original draft of this report recommended that Canada's Asia Pacific relations *not* be selected as the organizing theme for the 1997 annual National Forum on Canada's International Affairs. Instead, it was recommended that the sponsors/organizers of the Forum series select some other theme, and begin making the necessary preparations now for an Asia Pacific forum within two to four years.

It is recognized that there is a sense of urgency surrounding the need to catalyse non-government debate on Canada's Asia Pacific relations, particularly in light of the apparent decline of Canada's relative share of Eastern Asian markets and relative importance within regional multilateral fora

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87. A number of commentators, both government and non-government, have acknowledged Canada's reputation among Eastern Asian states as an "inattentive and intermittent participant in regional affairs." D.B. Dewitt & B.L. Job, "Asia Pacific Security Studies in Canada," p. 82.

over the last few years. [88] Yet this sense of urgency should not obscure the fact that the cultivation of an informed public dialogue on Canada's Asia Pacific relations will take some time, and that a single public forum—even a successful one—is not likely to have significant immediate effects on the vitality and efficacy of our regional policies.

It is also acknowledged that by staging a National Forum focused on Canada's Asia Pacific relations during Canada's Year of Asia Pacific, the "efficiency" of dedicated government resources would be compounded, greater attention might be drawn from the business community to the Forum process and from the national NGO community to CYAP, and valuable feedback on CYAP could be generated in time to condition the remaining portions of its implementation. Yet there is also a risk that the limited resources available for building up a participatory process for Asia Pacific issues will be dissipated if that which is put together does not have a strong foundation. One of the most serious weaknesses of previous National Fora has been the relatively limited time and resources set aside for preparation. Early indications suggest that this weakness has not yet been remedied, [89] and may be compounded by the relative underdevelopment of consultative channels related to the Asia Pacific policy context. By choosing to conduct a National Forum on Canada's Asia Pacific relations at least two years from now and planning accordingly, appropriate time and energy could be devoted to contacting a broad array of potential participants and developing preparatory information packages.

Third, the limited contact and relatively pronounced latent polarization between potential business and NGO participants today could lead to an exceptionally confrontational dialogue, and could sour future encounters in consultative fora. If a National Fora focusing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations were two to four years away, this latent polarization could be at least partly addressed by encouraging prior contact and exchange between potential participants, especially through small conferences on issues carefully chosen to highlight areas of concern common to academic, business, and NGO representatives (i.e., regime stability/"political risk"/human rights). Finally, there is a substantial degree of latent overlap between potential participants and subject matter for

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88. APFC, *Canada Asia Review 1997* (Vancouver: APFC, 1997), pp. 9-10.

89. Many of the problems associated with previous preparatory scrambles could be overcome relatively easily, by initiating the approval and planning process for each Forum at least 18 months ahead and making contact with steering committee members well in advance, by maintaining permanent regional (non-government) organizing committees, and by providing for the assignment of at least one junior DFAIT official to oversee the coordination of contact with potential participants and the collection and timely distribution of preparatory materials.

a National Forum and other CYAP-affiliated conferences. [90] This reflects another manifestation of the potential for domestic "Asia Pacific fatigue," as the pool of those interested in participating in such fora would either be driven to exhaustion or split into small fragments.

None of these concerns are strictly prohibitive however, and the government's recent decision to focus the 1997 National Forum on Canada's Asia Pacific relations is certainly not bad news. The following recommendations are offered to maximize the effectiveness of the 1997 Forum as a step toward a durable and effective participatory process:

as soon as possible, set baseline standards for the following and make them clear to all participants: priority to be placed on reaching consensus and attention to concrete policy recommendations, responsibilities of session chairs, basic format for reporting forum findings and recommendations, and roles to be played by government participants;

provide participants with preparatory information on current government policies and priorities, and on policy option controversies, as reflected in contemporary academic research and recent news media coverage;

coordinate with the organizers of other Asia Pacific-focused fora taking place in 1997, in order to minimize overlap of thematic content and participation;

encourage aggressive recruiting of speakers and participants from the Canadian business community, which has been under-represented in previous National Fora; and

invite key Forum participants to contribute to an informal workshop (immediately following the Forum) designed collect views on long-term strategies for strengthening the role of public input in Asia Pacific policy-making.

Following Through

Most of the findings and recommendations of this report affirm and support the general direction taken by the current government in developing an inclusive and effective participatory foreign policy process for Canada's Asia Pacific relations. Divergences between current government approaches and those recommended in this report were generally matters of emphasis or priority

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90. For example, the Couchiching Institute of Public Affairs' Summer Conference for (August) 1997 is entitled "Canada and the Asia-Pacific Promise: Hope, Hype and Reality," and will cover subjects as diverse as Eastern Asia's importance in world politics, trans-Pacific cultural tensions and Canada's priorities in the region. n.a., "Canada and the Asia-Pacific Promise: Hope, Hype and Reality" *Couchiching News* (Spring 1997), p. 2. The annual Conference of CANCAPS will be held in Montreal in December. Similar conferences and workshops are currently being planned for the second half of 1997.

only. The success of these initiatives depends on the creativity and determination of government in fulfilling its linked commitments to exploring new opportunities and responsibilities in the Asia Pacific region and to making the Canadian foreign policy process more "democratic." Several of the proposals outlined here entail maintaining or extending commitments of government resources, either through government-administered programs or support for non-government organizations, at a time when government is under mounting pressure to do more and spend less. This pressure sets up incentives for DFAIT and other government agencies to concentrate on splashy media events and immediate results. Unfortunately, the programs that are likely to do the most in the long run to raise public awareness and stimulate constructive debate are those that will generate the least political capital in the short run: issue-focused multi-sector workshops and conferences, directed curricula development programs, sponsorship of news media awards and information-sharing networks, survey research charting the effectiveness of government efforts, etc. To be sure, there are ways in which the financial burden on government can be lightened, including private sector sponsorship and cost-sharing partnerships and joint ventures with like-minded countries. But successful mutually-reinforcing domestic and regional policies will ultimately require a sustained investment of government money and, more importantly, attention.

APPENDIX ONE
RECENT CANADIAN POLL DATA ON ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES

This appendix presents selected questions and data uncovered in a search for public opinion research bearing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations. The search was conducted through public archive holdings at the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion at Queen's University and the Data Library at the University of British Columbia, with attention to research conducted between 1988 and 1996 by the Angus Reid Group, Decima Research, the Gallup Organization, and Roper/Starch Research. [91] Time constraints on the project precluded an extended search of the poll research holdings of DFAIT and DND; however, the author was able to obtain a small number of recent, unpublished poll research analyses prepared by the Communications Bureau of DFAIT.

Though this search was not exhaustive, its findings are suggestive of both the types of questions featured and the general results of recent government polling on themes related to Canada's Asia Pacific relations. A more extensive search of government and non-government survey research holdings, with systematic attention to the ratio of poll questions directly bearing on Asia Pacific themes to those on other regions, could provide a more "complete" picture of the adequacy and nature of polling in this area, and is therefore recommended. Appendix Two offers a brief listing of sample questions which could be useful to the development of a long-term strategy for directed poll research.

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91. Goldfarb questions and data (tables 1.2, 1.4 and 1.8) reproduced by permission of Goldfarb Consultants. Roper/Starch questions and data (tables 1.5, 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11) reproduced by permission of Roper/Starch Research.

TABLE 1.1

CANADIANS' HIGHEST-PRIORITY FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE

Response to question, "Through its foreign policy, Canada can try to do a number of things. I'd like to read you a number of possible objectives and ask you to tell me which *one* you feel should be given the highest priority. Is it: promoting trade opportunities for Canada; protecting the world's environment; promoting human rights around the world; working for peace and arms control; helping poorer countries develop; or working to end poverty and starvation in the world?" [emphasis added]

Foreign Policy Objective	**%**
Promote trade opportunities for Canada	18.2
Protect world's environment	21.7
Promote human rights around the world	10.2
Work for peace and arms control	16.5
Help poorer countries develop	7.8
Work to end poverty and starvation	23.5
No Opinion	2.1

Source: Decima Research, survey of 1500 adults, *Decima Quarterly* 51 (Fall 1992). Stored at *Decima Quarterly* archive at the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (CSPO), Queen's University, file R2722.

TABLE 1.2
CANADIAN PUBLIC: MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES/REGIONS FOR CANADA

Responses to question, "Which 3 or 4 of the following countries/regions should Canada consider a high priority in terms of its overall relations with them?"

COUNTRY/REGION	1993 %	1996 %
United States	90	94
Japan	*63*	*56*
Western Europe	53	54
China	*32*	*44*
Former Soviet Union	28	15
Mexico	23	29
Eastern Europe	23	21
Australia / New Zealand	*17*	*20*
Middle East	12	13
Latin America	8	14
Africa	5	5

Source: Goldfarb Consultants, survey of 1626 adults, February 1993; Goldfarb Consultants, survey of 1653 adults, February 1996 (emphasis added). Reproduced in: "Public Opinion Update: Canadian Views of the Asia Pacific Region" DFAIT, unpublished document, July 1996.

TABLE 1.3
CANADIAN PUBLIC: MOST IMPORTANT TRADE PARTNER, NEXT TEN YEARS

Response to question, "Canada has relations with almost all regions of the world. Which *one* of the following regions should Canada focus on most in developing its trade relations in the next ten years: the United States; Western Europe; Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union; Africa; the Middle East; Latin America; Japan; China; Asian countries, excluding China and Japan; or Australia and New Zealand?" [emphasis added]

Country/Region	%
United States	25.6
Western Europe	11.6
Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union	20.7
Africa	4.7
Middle East	2.0
Latin America	2.9
Japan	11.1
China	5.7
Asian countries, exc. China and Japan	7.4
Australia and New Zealand	2.4
No Opinion	5.9
Combined: China, Japan, Asian countries, Aus., N.Z.	26.6

Source: Decima Research, survey of 1500 adults, *Decima Quarterly* 51 (Fall 1992). Stored in index of Decima Quarterly files, Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, Queen's University, file R2722.

TABLE 1.4
CANADIAN PUBLIC: MOST IMPORTANT ASIA PACIFIC TRADE PARTNERS

Responses to question, "More specifically, which two or three of the following Asia Pacific countries should Canada consider high priority in terms of our trading relations with them?"

Country	%
Japan	84
China	74
Australia	38
Korea	32
India	21
Indonesia	10

Source: Goldfarb Consultants, survey of 1653 adults, February 1996. Reproduced in: "Public Opinion Update: Canadian Views of the Asia Pacific Region" DFAIT, unpublished document, July 1996.

TABLE 1.5
CANADIAN PUBLIC: APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF TRADE WITH EASTERN ASIAN STATES

Responses to question, "We would like to find out how much you think Canada should be trading with certain specific foreign countries. At the present time, do you think we are trading too much, about the right amount, or not enough with..."

Country	Too Much, %	About Right, %	Not Enough, %	Don't Know, %
United States	17	53	20	11
Germany	5	36	25	33
Japan	24	38	16	22
China	21	35	19	25
Korea	18	40	12	30
Taiwan	24	37	10	29
India	10	32	15	42
Indonesia	7	29	14	50

Source: Roper Reports, survey of 1200 Canadian adults, November 1995. Reproduced in: "Public Opinion Update: Canadian Views of the Asia Pacific Region" DFAIT, unpublished document, July 1996.

TABLE 1.6
CANADIAN PUBLIC: MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY/REGION FOR CANADA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, NEXT TEN YEARS

Response to question, "Of the regions just mentioned, which *one* do you think Canada should focus on most in providing development assistance and aid in the next ten years: the United States; Western Europe; Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union; Africa; the Middle East; Latin America; Japan; China; Asian countries, excluding China and Japan; or Australia and New Zealand?" [emphasis added]

Country/Region	%
United States	6.7
Western Europe	1.7
Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union	26.6
Africa	38.8
Middle East	3.4
Latin America	6.0
Japan	1.8
China	2.2
Asian countries, exc. China and Japan	5.5
Australia and New Zealand	0.7
No Opinion	6.6
Combined: China, Japan, Asian countries, Aus., N.Z.	10.2

Source: Decima Research, survey of 1500 adults, *Decima Quarterly* 51 (Fall 1992). Stored in *Decima Quarterly* archive at the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (CSPO), Queen's University, file R2724.

TABLE 1.7
CANADIAN PUBLIC: MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY/REGION FOR CANADA'S DEFENCE RELATIONS, NEXT TEN YEARS

Response to question, "Which *one* of these regions should Canada focus on most in its defence relations over the next ten years: the United States, Western Europe; Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union; Africa; the Middle East; Latin America; Japan; China; Asian countries, excluding China and Japan; or Australia and New Zealand?" [emphasis added]

Country/Region	**%**
United States	34.4
Western Europe	6.4
Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union	16.0
Africa	3.6
Middle East	12.6
Latin America	1.1
Japan	2.1
China	2.9
Asian countries, exc. China and Japan	3.1
Australia and New Zealand	0.9
No Opinion	17.0
Combined: China, Japan, Asian countries, Aus., N.Z.	9.0

Source: Decima Research, survey of 1500 adults, *Decima Quarterly* 51 (Fall 1992). Stored at *Decima Quarterly* archive at the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (CSPO), Queen's University, file R2725.

TABLE 1.8
CANADIAN PUBLIC: FAMILIARITY WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Responses to question, "Below is a list of organizations to which Canada belongs. Please indicate how familiar you are with each: very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar, or not at all familiar."

Organization	Very Familiar %	Somewhat Familiar %	Not Very Familiar %	Not At All Familiar %	No Response %
United Nations	32.4	44.4	15.6	6.5	1.2
Commonwealth	26.0	41.0	22.4	9.2	1.4
Group of Seven / G-7	17.3	31.5	26.6	22.8	1.9
La Francophonie	6.6	15.4	30.7	44.8	2.7
OAS	4.1	19.3	37.8	36.4	2.4
APEC Forum	*2.7*	*10.3*	*38.0*	*46.8*	*2.1*

Source: Goldfarb Consultants, survey of 1568 adults, February 1995 (#958001) (listed in descending order, according to number of respondents selecting "very familiar"; emphasis added).

TABLE 1.9
CANADIAN PUBLIC: PRIORITY PLACED ON PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Responses to question, "Canada is involved in a number of global organizations. I am going to read you a list of some of these organizations and would like your opinion as to whether Canada's involvement in supporting that particular organization should be given a high, medium or low priority..."

Organization	High Priority %	Medium Priority %	Low Priority %	Don't Know %
United Nations	43	35	9	13
World Trade Organization	39	39	7	15
NATO	35	36	14	15
G-7	34	35	10	21
Commonwealth	24	43	19	14
La Francophonie	20	30	32	18
APEC Forum	*19*	*33*	*20*	*28*
OAS	14	31	28	27

Source: Roper/Starch, survey of 1241 adults, October-November 1996 (emphasis added). Reproduced in Roper Reports Canada, "Report to External Affairs [sic]," unpublished document, December 1996.

TABLE 1.10
CANADIAN PUBLIC: SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN ASIA PACIFIC TRADE "ALLIANCE"

Responses to question, "As part of Canada's efforts to increase foreign trade with various regions and countries, Canada has formed an alliance with 17 other nations in the Pacific Rim. To which extent do you agree or disagree Canada should be part of this 17 nation alliance?"

Opinion	%
Strongly Agree	31
Somewhat Agree	46
Somewhat Disagree	6
Strongly Disagree	2
Don't Know	14

Source: Roper/Starch, survey of 1241 adults, October-November 1996. Reproduced in Roper Reports Canada, "Report prepared for External Affairs [sic]," unpublished document, December 1996.

TABLE 1.11
CANADIAN PUBLIC: SUPPORT FOR PURSUIT OF AN ASIA PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA

Response to question, "Do you think Canada should enter in a free trade agreement with the members of this 17 nation Pacific Rim alliance?"

Opinion	%
Strongly Agree	23
Somewhat Agree	40
Somewhat Disagree	12
Strongly Disagree	9
Don't Know	16

Source: Roper/Starch, survey of 1241 adults, October-November 1996. Reproduced in Roper Reports Canada, "Report prepared for External Affairs [sic]," unpublished document, December 1996.

APPENDIX TWO
MODEL QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY RESEARCH

An extensive explanation of the content, format and possible interpretations of the poll questions presented below would entail a rather lengthy paper in itself. They are intended as a rough guide for survey research development only, and not as a complete questionnaire or program for survey research.

These questions are intended to be complementary to those uncovered in the search for recent poll data and analysis outlined in Appendix One. (Note that questions similar to those presented here may actually have been posed in recent survey research not uncovered in that search.) It is strongly recommended that future research on public opinion regarding Canada's roles and priorities in the Asia Pacific region be conducted within the context of a long-term strategy for directed survey research and public engagement, and that such a strategy be developed with reference to a more extensive evaluation of existing polling methods and results than that presented here. With reference to the paper's argument for cultivating a base for informed public dialogue on Canada's Asia Pacific relations, it is recommended that this long-term strategy for survey research be oriented toward measuring public awareness of regional issues and Canadian policies, and tracking general policy preferences/priorities. Some types of questions may not be viable or appropriate in the context of any given opinion poll. Again, this listing is offered as *suggestive* of the kinds of results that would be desirable within the context of a sustained effort to monitor public awareness and preferences.

Knowledge of Regional Affairs, Canada's Asia Pacific Relations (Factual Test)

Questions of this type have little value on their own, and should be used only to structure multi-variate analyses—e.g., comparison of responses to various policy preference questions (below), between respondents demonstrating basic knowledge of relevant aspects of regional affairs and respondents not demonstrating such knowledge.

Canada is involved in trade with many different regions. Please rank the following regions in terms of their share of Canada's total imports and exports, so that the region representing the largest share is assigned the value "1" and the region representing the smallest share is assigned the value "4."
Obtain response—1, 2, 3, or 4—for each of the following (each response for one region only):

Asia Pacific
Europe
North America
Africa

The correct ranking is: North America 1, Asia Pacific 2, Europe 3, Africa 4. Note that this is true even if "Asia Pacific" is understood to include only the states of Eastern Asia (as opposed to also including those of Southern Asia and/or other regions/subregions).

Source: J.D. Kenneth Boutin & David B. Dewitt, "Canadian Relations with the Asia Pacific Region: A Statistical Sourcebook" *CANCAPS Papiers* 10 (September 1996), pp. 18-22, 27-30.

Sovereign control over one of the following territories was transferred to the People's Republic of China in July of 1997—is it Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, or Cambodia?

Obtain response:
Korea
Hong Kong
Singapore
Cambodia

The correct response is Hong Kong.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) is an ongoing dialogue between the governments of the region on issues related to the expansion of trade. Is Canada a member of this organization?

Obtain response—*yes*, *no*, or *don't know*.

The correct answer is yes. Canada has been a member of the APEC forum since its founding in 1989.

Immigrants come to Canada from all regions of the world. Over the last five or six years, what percentage of immigrants to Canada would you say have come from Eastern Asia?

Obtain response:
five percent
ten percent
thirty percent
sixty percent

The most accurate response is thirty percent. Between 1985 and 1992, immigrants from Eastern Asia accounted for between 25.8 and 35.7 percent of the total number of immigrants.

Source: J.D.K. Boutin & D.B. Dewitt, "Canadian Relations with the Asia Pacific Region," p. 117.

Familiarity with Regional Affairs, Canada's Asia Pacific Relations (Self-Evaluation)

Again, these questions are most useful in the context of multivariate analysis, and should be used and evaluated with reference to preference/priority questions. These are not knowledge-test questions, and questioners should be instructed to present them accordingly.

Canada is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Would you describe yourself as very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar or not at all familiar with this organization?

Obtain response—*very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar,* or *not at all familiar.*

Canada has been engaged in dialogue on regional security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region for many years. How would you describe your level of familiarity with issues relating to regional security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region—very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar, or not at all familiar?

Obtain response—*very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar,* or *not at all familiar.*

Are you aware that the government has designated 1997 Canada's Year of Asia Pacific?

Obtain response—*yes* or *no.*

Perception of Asia Pacific Region, Canada's Asia Pacific Relations

Below is a map of the world [world map with Pacific Ocean at centre]. Please use a pen to circle the area that you think constitutes the Asia Pacific region, being careful to include all of the countries which are part of the region and to leave out those which are not.

Obviously, a question of this type will not be viable within the context of a phone survey; it could, however, be very effective in a small focus group. The key to making use of data from a question of this type would be in setting up interpretive guidelines. Particular attention should be paid to whether or not the following countries have been included within the circled area: Canada, the United States, Mexico and/or any part of Latin America, Australia and/or New Zealand, India.

Which of the following phrases best describes Canada's relationship to the Asia Pacific region?

Obtain response:

member
partner
interested outsider
disinterested outsider
don't know

Which of these phrases best describes Canada's overall contribution to regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific region?

Obtain response—*very important, somewhat important, relatively unimportant, very unimportant,* or *don't know.*

Preferences: Priorities, Trade-Offs

Canada's relations with the countries of the Asia Pacific region cover a wide variety of different issues and concerns. Below is a list of issues bearing on Canada's Asia Pacific relations. Please indicate the priority you believe should be placed on each issue, by rating it on a scale from one to seven, with higher numbers assigned to higher priority issues.

Obtain response—*1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,* or *7*—for each of the following:

promotion of trade and investment opportunities for Canada
protection of the environment
promotion of human rights
pursuit of peace and arms control
assistance to developing countries
reduction of poverty and starvation

There is some controversy as to whether it is more appropriate for Canada to deal with countries that have a poor record on protecting human rights or the environment through diplomatic isolation or diplomatic engagement. Which of the following statements is closest to your own views:

Obtain response:

Canada should cut diplomatic ties with countries that have a poor record on human rights and the environment, and use economic and political leverage to pressure them to reform.

Canada should maintain diplomatic ties with all countries that have a poor record on human rights and the environment, and use economic and political incentives to induce them to reform .

Don't know

Volunteered conditional responses (i.e., *"it depends..."*) should be recorded separately under a fourth category, and worked into analysis accordingly.

Some people have argued that Canada does not have the resources to be deeply involved in every area of international politics. Do you believe that Canada's involvement in Asia Pacific regional politics is important enough to maintain, even if it could take resources away from possible involvement in other regions, such as Europe?

Obtain response—*yes, no,* or *don't know.*

Evaluation of Government Policy

Do you believe that the present government is doing a good job of upholding the interests and concerns of Canadians through its policies in the Asia Pacific region?
Obtain response—*yes*, *no*, or *don't know*.

I will read a list of issues bearing on Canada's relations with the countries of the Asia Pacific region. Please tell me if you think the present government is doing a good job of upholding the interests and concerns of Canadians with respect to each of the following issues:
Obtain answer—*yes*, *no*, or *don't know*—for each of the following:

promotion of trade and investment opportunities for Canada
protection of the environment
promotion of human rights
pursuit of peace and arms control
assistance to developing countries
reduction of poverty and starvation

Young Adults: Awareness of and Interest in Canada's Asia Pacific Relations

For many of the types of questions presented above, data should be compared according to a wide variety of respondent attributes, including age. Questions of the types outlined below should be included in larger polls directed specifically at young adults (18-24, 25-34), and should be subject to multivariate analysis, according to respondent attributes such as region, urban/rural residence, gender, educational background, and ethnocultural heritage.

Canadian secondary school students are expected to receive instruction on the distinctive history, politics and culture of many regions of the world. If you attended secondary school in Canada, how would you describe the amount of attention to the Asia Pacific region in your textbooks and classroom instruction, as compared to other regions?
Obtain response:
more than other regions
about the same as other regions
less than other regions
don't know

Canadians can expect to have many different kinds of contact with the people, ideas and products of various regions. Which of the following countries or regions do you think will play the most important role in shaping your future?
Obtain response:
Africa
Eastern Asia
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
United States
Latin America

As Canada's relations with the Asia Pacific region continue to grow, more Canadians will have contact with people, ideas or products from Eastern Asia. Which of the following contacts with the countries of Eastern Asia do you expect to have during your lifetime?

Obtain response—*yes*, *no*, or *don't know*—for each of the following:

reside in Eastern Asia for 6 months or more
speak one or more Eastern Asian languages
travel to Eastern Asia
learn about one or more Eastern Asian societies in school
conduct trade or make investments with Eastern Asian companies
purchase products or services from Eastern Asia

APPENDIX THREE
BREAK-DOWN OF EVENTS AFFILIATED WITH CANADA'S YEAR OF ASIA PACIFIC (CYAP)

This appendix presents a categorization of events officially affiliated with Canada's Year of Asia Pacific (CYAP), as listed in the "Calendar of Events" provided on the DFAIT internet site, as of April 15, 1997. (Note that this listing has expanded rapidly since the beginning of 1997, and additional events are likely to be added.)

TABLE 3.1
NUMBER OF CYAP EVENTS, BY CATEGORY

Event Category	Number
Arts Exhibition or Cultural Celebration	188
Forum, Trade and/or Investment Focus	31
Forum, Political or Social Issues Focus	20
Official APEC or Other Inter-governmental Forum	15

Source: DFAIT internet site (http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/`cyap-acap/english/cyapevts.htm), as of April 15, 1997.

EXPLANATION OF CATEGORIES:

Arts Exhibition or Cultural Celebration: cultural exhibition or performance (literature, printing, publishing, painting, sculpture, woodcut, or mixed-medium arts or applied arts exhibition; musical, theatre or dance performance; film), parade or other celebration of cultural heritage.

Forum, Trade and/or Investment Focus: conference, exhibition, or meeting with specific focus on business issues; includes both invitational and "open" for a.

Forum, Political or Social Issues Focus: conference or meeting with focus on political or social issues, including communications, research and education, immigration, and regional security; includes both invitational and "open" fora (a listing of events selected for this category is provided below).

Official APEC or Other Inter-governmental Forum: APEC Ministers' meeting, APEC working group meeting; other inter-governmental diplomatic dialogue or conference; APEC-sponsored exhibition or symposium.

LISTING OF EVENTS FOR CATEGORY "FORUM, POLITICAL OR SOCIAL ISSUES FOCUS"

- National Conferences on the Impact of Hong Kong 1997 on Chinese Canadian Communities (Organizer: Chinese Canadian National Council; Toronto, March 1-April 30).
- "The News From Hong Kong: Getting the Real Story" (Organizer: Simon Fraser University; Vancouver, April 24-25).
- "Canada in Asia - Asia in Media" Conference (Organizer: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada; Toronto, April 28-29).
- "APEC Linkages for Future Leaders" Study Tour (Organizer: Conference Board of Canada; Calgary, May 1-12).
- "Reaching for Success: Business and Education Working Together" (Organizer: Conference Board of Canada; Calgary, May 4-6).
- "Asia Connects - Cherchons l'Asie" Youth Conference (Organizers: the Student's Commission, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, DFAIT; Winnipeg, May 4-11).
- Canada - ASEAN Joint Consultative Committee Meeting (Organizer: Canada - ASEAN Joint Consultative Meeting; Montreal, May 4-11).
- ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Meeting (Organizer: CIDA; Montreal May 6-7).
- 3rd Annual Conference de Montreal—Asia Pacific theme (Organizer: Conference de Montreal Secretariat; Montreal, May 11-13).
- APEC Study Centre Consortium Conference (Organizer: APFC, Banff, May 22-24).
- 1997 Conference of the Canadian Asian Studies Association (Organizer: CASA; St. John's, June 4).
- Gateway '97 Forum (Organizer: Greater Vancouver Gateway Council; Richmond, June 25-26).
- "Global Vision": Junior Team Canada to South East Asia (Organizer: Amy Giroud; Canada-wide, August).
- Couchiching Summer Conference: "Canada and the Asia Pacific: Hope, Hype and Reality" (Organizer: Couchiching Institute of Public Affairs; Geneva Park, August 7-10).
- Canada - Korea Forum (Organizer: JCAPS; Calgary, September)
- 2nd Annual International Conference of the Asia-Pacific Forum of Young Political Leaders (Organizer: Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo; Edmonton, September 2-5).
- Women Senior Leaders' Network Conference (Organizer: Conference Board of Canada; Ottawa, September 13-15).
- Canada World Youth Conference (Organizer: Alison Felkar; Vancouver, November).
- "Canada and the Pacific: Imperatives Facing Education": Canadian Bureau for International Education Annual Conference with the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and the Commonwealth of Learning (Organizer: Canadian Bureau for International Education; Ottawa, November 6-8).
- Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) Conference (Organizer: CANCAPS; Montreal, December).

APPENDIX FOUR
CATALOGUE OF NON-GOVERNMENT RESOURCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSULTATIVE INITIATIVES

The following is a non-exhaustive annotated catalogue of *Canadian* non-government resources which may be useful in designing and implementing multi-sectoral consultative initiatives. It features public and proprietary listings of contact information for academic specialists, business executives, labour organizers, news media firms, non-government organizations, as well as government officials at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, and could therefore play a role in identifying potential participants to consultative fora. However, it is intended only as a list of lists, from which users can draw ideas about what kinds of organizations are "out there," and not as a complete inventory from which names would be directly selected. (Note that, since some of these centres and associations are housed within others listed here, there is some "overlap" in the contact information.)

APEC Research Information Network (APECRIN)
Institute for Asian Research
University of British Columbia
C.K. Choi Building
1855 West Mall
Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z1 **http://www.iar.ubc.ca/apecrin/index.htm**
tel: (604) 822-3937

- non-government vehicle for collaborative research and activity coordination among Canadian NGOs interested in Asia Pacific issues, particularly those involving APEC; maintains bibliography of academic and NGO research on APEC, particularly social effects of regional integration
- internet site provides links to relevant government and non-government internet sites

Asian Canadian Resources **http://www.alvin.org/acr/org**

- internet site featuring collection of resources for Asian Canadian communities, with special attention to culture and communications issues

Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC)
(Research and Analysis Division)
666 - 999 Canada Place
Vancouver, BC V6C 3E1
tel: (604) 684-5986 **http://www.apfnet.org**
fax: (604) 681-1370

- coordinates Asia Pacific Foundation Research Network (APFRN), linking research, policy and business communities; houses APEC Study Centre in Canada
- maintains extensive databases of Canadian firms with substantial trade and/or investment concerns in Eastern Asia ("Companies Database") and of Canadian business associations and trade missions focusing on Eastern Asia ("Organizations Database")

- maintains directory of individuals and institutions currently involved in Asia Pacific educational initiatives in Canada at the K-12 level; maintains database of K-12 school curricula with special attention to Asia Pacific demography, geography, history, politics and economics; currently developing basic information packages on countries of Eastern Asia for use in the development of K-12 curricula
- through its sponsorship of correspondence assignments in Eastern Asia, maintains some information on Canadian news media correspondents with interest in Asia Pacific affairs
- publishes several series of research papers, targeted primarily at the Canadian business community; coordinates research with other organizations and organizes conferences and other events

Canadian Asian Studies Association (CASA)
Centre d'Etudes de l'Asie de l'Est
Universite de Montreal
C.P. 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville
Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7

- maintains directory of members (academic specialists on Asian politics and culture, some of whom conduct policy research)
- sponsors and organizes conferences and workshops on Asian issues

Canadian Advertising Rates & Data
Maclean Hunter Publishing Ltd.
Maclean Hunter Building
777 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M5W 1A7
tel: (416) 596-5000
fax: (416) 596-5158

- publishes an annual supplement, *Ethnic Media & Markets*, which lists publications, radio and television programs targeted at various ethnocultural groups in Canada, as well as various ethnic media support services; media organizations are listed according to the non-English language of the target ethnocultural group, including Cambodian, Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese), Fijian, Filipino, Hindi, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Laotian, Punjabi, Urdu, and Vietnamese; provides names and contact information for editors, managers and/or publishers

Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS)

Institute of International Relations
University of British Columbia
C456 - 1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
tel: (604) 822-5480
fax: (604) 822-5540

Centre for International & Security Studies
York University
3rd Floor, York Lanes; 4700 Keele Street
North York, ON M3J 1P3
tel: (416) 736-5156
fax: (416) 736-5752

- research and networking organization focusing on the politics of security in the Asia Pacific region
- extensive member directory provides names, contact information and research interests of dozens of Canadian scholars and others interested in Asia Pacific security issues; also lists

Canadian government Asia Pacific specialists and Canadian government representatives in Eastern Asia

- *CANCAPS Bulletin* series includes research and current events updates, reporting on CSCAP process, and research resources (including government documents and relevant internet sites and list-services); also publishes series of policy-oriented working papers (*CANCAPS Papiers*)

Canadian Committee, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (CC-PECC)
The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada acts as the Secretariat for the Canadian Committee for PECC. Contact information for APFC is listed above.

- a body of academic and business experts, coordinates Canadian participation in the PECC "track two" process

Canadian Member Committee, Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CMC/CSCAP)
Coordinator, CMC/CSCAP
Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies
270 York Lanes, York University
4700 Keele Street
North York, ON M3J 1P3
tel: (416) 736-5786
fax: (416) 736-5688

- coordinates activities of Canadian participants in CSCAP "track two" process

Institute of Asian Research
University of British Columbia
C.K. Choi Building, Room 251
1855 West Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
tel: (604)
fax: (604)

- several associates and researchers specializing in Asian politics and culture, regional economic and diplomatic affairs; coordinates activities of a number of smaller, specialized research centres and programs

Le Groupe Columbia Communications, Inc.
1350 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest
Bureau 1500
Montreal, PQ H3G 1J1
tel: (514) 987-1707
fax: (514) 987-9938

- in 1996, prepared a survey report for DFAIT on the views of selected government officials and segments of the public ("stakeholders") on the value of and appropriate agenda for what has become Canada's Year of Asia Pacific 1997; the (proprietary) report includes an appendix listing the names and contact information for persons consulted

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- 40 academic associates specializing in Asia Pacific issues
- founding member institute of CSCAP, CANCAPS
- coordinates Asian Business Studies Program, sponsors and supports workshops oriented to business community
- offers public seminars and workshops for community groups and associations on issues related to Canada's Asia Pacific relations

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- several associates and researchers with specialized knowledge of Asia Pacific issues
- secretariat (with Institute of International Relations at U.B.C.) for CANCAPS
- maintains a small library collection of research materials on Asia Pacific security issues, including various conference proceedings and North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) working papers; currently initiating extended research program on Development and Security in Southeast Asia

Note that there are many bilateral business associations in Canada focusing on the promotion of trade and investment links with specific Eastern Asian countries (or groups of countries). Among the larger of these are the **Canada China Business Council** (based in Toronto), and the **Canada Japan Trade Council** (based in Ottawa). There is also interest in aspects of Canada's Asia Pacific relations on the part of many of the firms and associations represented by some of Canada's larger business advocacy groups, including the **Business Council on National Issues** (BCNI) and the **Canadian Business and Industry Advisory Committee** (CBIAC).

Note that there are a number of large non-government organizations or umbrella committees in Canada interested in various facets of Canada's Asia Pacific relations. Among these are the **Canadian Council of Churches** (based in Toronto), the **Canadian Council for International Cooperation** (based in Ottawa), and the **International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development** (based in Montreal). Each of these organizations has participated in the development of the "1997 People's Summit on APEC" (Vancouver, November 17-21).

APPENDIX FIVE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT RESEARCH ON CANADA'S ROLES AND PRIORITIES WITHIN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

This appendix lists recently-published, policy-relevant research works focusing on Canada's roles and priorities within the Asia Pacific region that could be useful in preparing background information materials for consultative initiatives. Items have been selected according to their attention to the emerging regional security architecture and/or the role of various sectors of the public in the formation of Canadian policies bearing upon it. In consideration of the time and costs associated with preparing information briefs of this kind, care has been taken to select articles which are relatively brief and/or made up of free-standing, subtitled thematic segments.

A more extensive inventory of research on Canada's links with the countries of Eastern Asia may be found in:

J.D. Kenneth Boutin, *Canadian Relations with the Asia Pacific Region: A Select Bibliography of Sources, 1960-1996* (CANCAPS Papiers #11) (Toronto/Vancouver: CANCAPS, 1996).

Acharya, Amitav. *Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Dilemmas for Foreign Policy* (Eastern Asia Policy Papers #11) (Toronto: JCAPS, 1995).

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Chessum, Steve. "DND's Role in Asia Pacific Security" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 12 (February 1997): 12-13.

Dewitt, David B. & Amitav Acharya. *Cooperative Security and Developmental Assistance: The Relationship Between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia* (Eastern Asia Policy Papers #16)(Toronto: JCAPS, 1996).

Dewitt, David B. & Brian L. Job. "Asia Pacific Security Studies in Canada" (pp. 69-106), in Paul M. Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities* (Toronto: JCAPS, 1994).

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Hall, Ingrid. "Translating Canada's Asia Pacific Aspirations into Results" *CANCAPS Bulletin* 12 (February 1997): 10-12.

Langdon, Frank. "Canada's Goal in the Asia Pacific" *The Pacific Review* 8:2 (1995): 383-400.

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Selin, Shannon & Gerard Hervouet & Brian Job & Richard Stubbs. *Stability, Security and Business in Asia Pacific* (Issues for APEC #3 - APEC Study Centre in Canada) (Vancouver: APFC, 1996).

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